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Abstract
Charter schools are one of the most iconic public-private partnership (PPP) formulas 
in education. Nonetheless, despite charter school programs having been implemented 
in some countries for decades and their global diffusion, evidence on their impact in 
education systems is far from conclusive.
This report analyzes the case of the Colegios en Concesión (CEC), a paradigmatic charter 
school program implemented in Bogotá since 1999 to beneﬁ t students from poor areas 
of the city. By adopting a realist evaluation approach, our research discusses to what 
extent the assumptions behind the promotion of the CEC program in Colombia are met 
in real situations, and challenges some of the main conclusions that existing evaluations 
of this program have reached so far.
This study shows that the CEC program has not achieved the expected results: these 
schools enjoy only of moderate levels of school autonomy; their economic efﬁ ciency 
largely relies on a drastic worsening of teachers’ employment conditions; many CEC 
schools have strategically selected their students during enrollment processes, 
though this practice is not allowed by the Education Department; and the pedagogical 
differentiation that these schools have promoted within the education system has not 
necessarily translated into substantive academic improvement. In fact, in relation to the 
latter, we have observed that in terms of learning outcomes, there are not statistically 
signiﬁ cant differences between CEC and public schools after controlling for school day 
and the economic status of students. However, we have also seen how CEC schools have 
had the capacity to generate high levels of loyalty among their more direct users, and 
both parents and students are deeply engaged and satisﬁ ed with these schools. Overall, 
our results raise some challenging questions about the effects, in terms of equity, quality 
and segregation, of the CEC program in the Colombian education system.
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1. Introduction
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education are increasingly conceived as an optimal 
policy solution to advance toward the Education for All goals (Patrinos et al. 2009). 
PPPs are deﬁ ned as contracts “of some sort of durability between public and private 
actors, in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and 
resources that are connected with these products” (Hodge et al. 2010: 4). In education, 
the adoption of PPPs means the promotion and introduction of values and mechanisms 
coming from the private sector into public education, such as competition, choice, 
results-based incentives, and market like mechanisms (LeGrand 1996).1 Among the 
most emblematic PPPs in education policies we ﬁ nd voucher schemes, the removal of 
school zones to enable parental choice, or the creation of publicly ﬁ nanced and privately 
operated “charter schools” (Lubienski 2009). 
Charter schools have become an international model of schooling that is being 
increasingly adopted in both developed and developing countries. Although the speciﬁ c 
characteristics of each charter school program can vary according to its context, charter 
schools are commonly deﬁ ned as hybrids of public and private institutions. They are 
schools funded and owned by the public sector, managed by the private sector, and 
exempted from many state and local regulations (Hanushek et al. 2007, Nathan 1996). 
According to Lubienski (2003a, 2003b, 2005 and 2006) and Lubienski and Lubienski 
(2006), charter school advocates assume that these programs enjoy the superiority of 
private-style organizational models and promote school autonomy, parental choice and 
competition between public and private schools. The combination of these elements is 
expected to foster educational innovation at both the pedagogical and the organizational 
levels and, ultimately, improve academic results (see Friedman 1955, Hassel 1999). 
Charter schools are also expected to provide vulnerable students with the opportunity to 
access good quality education, which is why they receive public funding. Finally, another 
advantage of charter schools, according to privatization advocates, is that these schools 
promote the diversiﬁ cation of those educational systems in which the public sector is 
excessively constrained by bureaucratic regulations that make pedagogical innovation 
difﬁ cult (generating a homogeneous “one-size-ﬁ ts-all” school system) (Chubb & Moe 
1990, Tooley 1999).
1.1 About this Report
The research we present in this report tests these assumptions about the superiority of 
the charter school model by analyzing in-depth the emblematic Colegios en Concesión 
(CEC) charter program, which was adopted in Bogotá and quickly disseminated to 
other parts of Colombia and even to the global South, thanks to its sponsorship by 
international organizations such as the World Bank (Edwards 2014). The importance of 
1. In general, the growing expansion of PPPs in developing countries has been favored by two main factors. First, in 
most developing countries governments are looking for new formulas of education delivery that improve educational 
outputs in a more cost-effective way, including partnering with the private sector. Second, PPPs are being strongly 
advocated by many inﬂ uential international organizations, including—among others—the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the World Economic 
Forum, UNESCO and UNICEF (Verger 2012). 
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the Bogotá model of charter schools gives special relevance to the question of whether 
the expected effects of CEC on efﬁ ciency or equity do really take place, and especially 
under which conditions are they implemented. In particular, in this report we aim to 
answer the following questions: How different is the organizational and pedagogical 
approach of CEC in relation to regular public schools? Are the academic results of the 
CEC signiﬁ cantly different from the results of public schools operating under similar 
conditions? If so, why? Does the introduction of CEC increase the equality of educational 
opportunities for poor Colombian students? Are CEC schools an effective and viable 
potential alternative to the public school system?
The answer to these main questions (and other sub-questions that will appear in 
the report) requires a holistic approach to the topic that combines qualitative and 
quantitative strategies. Our research project explored Colombian education databases, 
reviewed existing evaluations of the model, compared academic results of CEC and 
public schools in the national standardized tests, and carried out in-depth qualitative 
ﬁ eldwork in the city of Bogotá and in several CEC, particularly through interviews with 
stakeholders, focus groups and school observations.
 
The report is structured in four main parts. First, we present the main features of the CEC 
program and a brief history on how this program has been embedded in the Colombian 
education system. Second, we brieﬂ y explain the methodology of the research project, 
including the realist evaluation approach we have adopted, our sample and data 
collection strategy. Third, we present the main results of the research project according 
to three different analytical dimensions: (1) organizational change at the school level, in 
terms of enrollment processes, level of school autonomy, leadership styles and planning, 
pedagogical activities, material resources and services, funding and school-family 
relationships; (2) pedagogical and educational approach, including teaching practices 
such as the teaching to the test, values education and the effects of the socioeconomic 
context on pedagogical practices; and (3) CEC’s academic results. In the fourth and ﬁ nal 
section we summarize the main results and present our main conclusions.
1.2 About the Colombian Education System
Within the Latin American context, Colombia is one of the countries that has embraced 
more enthusiastically the charter schools idea (Barrera et al. 2012), particularly through 
the program of Colegios en Concesión (CEC, or Concession Schools). The emergence of 
the CEC in Colombia needs to be contextualized in relation to the speciﬁ c characteristics 
and needs of this educational system, namely its enrollment rate, a chronic lack of 
school places and continuous privatization trends. The Colombian educational system 
is characterized by relatively high rates of enrollment in primary education, but relatively 
low rates for secondary education. In the last decade, there have been signiﬁ cant 
advances in access to both education levels, although with important differences 
between them. Between 2002 and 2012 the net enrollment rate increased moderately: 
in pre-primary to 63.4 percent (+5.1 percent), in primary to 87.1 percent (–2.8 percent), 
in lower secondary to 71.5 percent (+14.4 percent) and in upper secondary to 41 percent 
(+11.5 percent), according to data from the Ministry of Education’s Integrated Enrollment 
System (SIMAT). However, enrollment in urban areas is much higher than in rural areas, 
and these regional differences are intimately correlated with ethnic distribution (Barrera 
et al. 2012). Also, large numbers of students drop out at the end of lower secondary 
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education, during the transition from grade 6 to grade 7, and this pattern is perceived to 
be more pronounced in public schools than in private schools (Barrera 2006).
The relatively low net enrollment rates of the Colombian education system are linked to 
the deﬁ cit of school places. As today, the shortfall in school places remains important in 
Bogotá. In 2012 it was estimated that there was a shortfall of 31,481 school places: 11,821 
places in preschool, 7,387 seats in lower secondary and 8,640 seats in upper secondary 
(SED 2013b). The deﬁ cit of school places is more important in low socioeconomic status 
(SES) stratum areas. In addition, this gap between supply and demand is especially 
relevant in the case of CEC, since the demand for these schools far exceeds the places 
they can offer. 
The lack of school places in Colombia is to some extent explained by the insufﬁ cient 
public funding allocated to education. The average of total public expenditure on 
education as percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Latin America and the Caribbean 
was 4.5 percent in 2000 and 5.2 percent in 2010 (Bellei 2013). Colombia was below the 
regional average in both periods: 3.5 percent in 2000 and 4.8 percent in 2010. Miñana 
(2010b) stresses that, in the last decades, the Colombian government has increased 
educational coverage, but not necessarily the public expenditure on education. This has 
been possible by a substantive increase of the student/teacher ratio at all educational 
levels (Miñana 2010b).
In addition, the private sector has played a key role in the Colombian education sector 
(Miñana 2010a: 156). In rural areas, in particular, the Catholic Church brought education 
to communities that were not being properly served by the state (Quiceno 1988, Helg 
1988). As seen in Table 1, the presence of the private sector in education is important 
in Colombia, the department of Boyacá, and especially the city of Bogotá. In Bogotá, 
the importance of the private sector varies both by location and by education level.2 
Overall, there has been a process of recovery of public school enrollment in recent 
years. This is partially explained because the Secretary of Education of Bogotá (SED) has 
actively promoted student enrollment in public schools. As a result, public school places 
increased from 902,513 in 2004 to 935,957 in 2012 (+33,444, representing 57.5 percent 
and 62.2 percent of the total student population, respectively). In contrast, the private 
sector declined from 665,866 in 2004 to 568,741 in 2012 (–97,125).
Table 1—Percentage of private sector by education level; Colombia and Boyacá 2012
Kindergarten Pre-primary Primary Lower 
Secondary
Upper 
Secondary*
Colombia 93.6 17.8 14 14 17,7
Boyacá 98.8 17.4 12.5 8.3 10
Bogotá — 61.8 34.9 33.6 38,2
Sources: Ministry of Education’s Integrated Enrollment System (SIMAT) and SED (2013). 
Note: * Jardín, Transición, Primaria, Secundaria and Media.
2. In some of Bogotá’s localities, the private sector represents almost two-thirds of the total enrollment (64 percent 
in La Candelaria, 65 percent in Suba and 69 percent in Usaquén) and in other locations even more: 77 percent in 
Chapinero and 83 percent in Teusaquillo. 
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Not surprisingly, the students’ distribution between public and private schools is highly 
based on their SES. According to García Villegas et al. (2013), 93 percent of students 
with lower SES (in Colombia, SISBEN stratum 1) attend public schools, while the 98 
percent of students with the highest SES (SISBEN stratum 6) attend private schools.3
1.3 PPPs in Colombian Education: Colegios en Convenio, 
 PACES and CEC
In addition to the presence of totally private institutions, the Colombian education 
system has a long tradition of public-private partnerships. The ﬁ rst PPP modality are the 
so-called Colegios en Convenio (Subsidized Private Schools), which emerged in Colombia 
during the eighties. They are private schools that receive a publicly funded voucher 
(Miñana 2010b, Villegas & López 2011, Helg 1988) on one-year renewable contracts in 
locations where there is an insufﬁ cient public education offer. In general, these Subsidized 
Private Schools serve low SES populations, have precarious and inadequate installations 
(no sports facilities, libraries, etc.) and under-qualiﬁ ed teachers, and sometimes 
are even located in private houses. Because of this, they are commonly known as 
colegios de garaje (garage schools) (Miñana 2010a: 40). Of the total students in the 
public schools of Bogotá, 9.4 percent were enrolled in Subsidized Private Schools in the 
year 2013 (SED 2014). 
The second PPP modality we ﬁ nd in Colombia is the Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura 
de la Educación Secundaria (PACES, or Plan of Expansion of Secondary Education 
Coverage). The PACES was a voucher system that beneﬁ ted 125,000 students in the 
country’s biggest cities between 1991 and 1997 (King et al. 1997, Sarmiento 2000, Arenas 
2004). The vouchers were awarded by a lottery, covered half of the cost of attending a 
private school, and were renewable as long as students maintained satisfactory academic 
performance. The evaluation of PACES has been highly controversial. According to some 
authors, it had a positive impact on students, in terms of years of education, approval 
rate and probability of graduation from secondary education (Angrist et al. 2002 and 
2006). Furthermore, PACES students had higher chances to access higher education 
(Saavedra et al. 2012, Barrera et al. 2012). However, according to other authors there 
were not signiﬁ cant differences in mathematics and language performance among 
PACES students and public school students (King et al. 1997). Furthermore, in cases 
where differences were identiﬁ ed, most could be explained by the socioeconomic origin 
of the students (Sarmiento 2000). 
The third PPP modality we ﬁ nd in Colombia is the Colegios en Concesión (CEC, or 
Concession Schools) of Bogotá, a group of 25 charter schools newly constructed by the 
SED. These schools became the objects of a bidding process among private operators 
between 1999 and 2003. In order to be able to place a bid, Education Management 
Organizations (EMOs) had to be private non-proﬁ t organizations and demonstrate their 
“academic excellence.” The contract included a series of obligations such as: the CEC 
3. The National Information System on Social Programmes Beneﬁ ciaries (SISBEN) is an information system designed 
by the Colombian government to identify potential individual beneﬁ ciaries of social programs; the minimum SISBEN 
stratum is 0 and the maximum is 6. 
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should ensure certain standards regarding materials (physical infrastructure, equipment, 
teaching materials, etc.) and services (full school day, quality of food, etc.); the CEC’s 
ICFES results should be superior to those of nearby public schools;4 student enrollment 
processes should agree with the SED’s criteria related to geographical proximity, SISBEN 
stratum, vulnerable population and family uniﬁ cation; and proﬁ t is not allowed. 
The SED is responsible for ensuring that these obligations are actually met. To this 
purpose, the SED regularly evaluates the schools through different strategies. In 
some cases, it does so simply through administrative evaluations carried out by the 
SED’s inspectors (e.g., to assess the state of the physical infrastructure or students’ 
attendance). In other cases, the SED conducts more in-depth evaluations of the CEC 
program that focus on the academic performance and pedagogical strategies of the 
schools, among other variables. These evaluations are periodically carried out by an 
independent entity and they are high stakes: the contract contemplates the expulsion of 
the worst rated schools from the CEC program.
Since its inception, the tender faced some difﬁ culties. The requirements of the tender 
were high but the potential economic proﬁ ts were null; due to this, the EMOs’ motivation 
was based on social vocation, religious proselytizing, and image and prestige (Pérez & 
Rivera 2010). Also, the academic requirement of high ICFES results for the providers 
was a source of tension in contexts of low SES. For instance, some EMOs, despite 
having extensive experience in education in low SES contexts showed little ICFES results 
success. For this reason, in order to accomplish the tendering obligations, Fe y Alegría 
was forced to perform a Temporary Consortium with a more elitist Jesuit school. On 
the other hand, EMOs with excellent ICFES results, such as Gimnasio Moderno and 
the entities that constituted Alianza Educativa, had little experience in low SES contexts. 
Because of these reasons, the bids were not very competitive; in fact, there were few 
EMOs willing to tender.
As a result of the bidding processes, nine EMOs won those tenders: three private 
providers with more elitist backgrounds (Alianza Educativa [AAE], which managed ﬁ ve 
charter schools and Fenur and Gimnasio Moderno, which each managed one school; 
two compensation funds (Cafam, which managed four, and Colsubsidio, which managed 
ﬁ ve); and four religious EMOs (Calasanz and La Salle, which each managed one, Don 
Bosco, which managed ﬁ ve, and Fe y Alegría, which managed two) (for more detail, see 
Table 11 in Appendix 2). The EMOs were responsible for managing the CEC until 2014; 
depending on the bidding call, subsequent contracts lasted between 11 and 15 years. In 
all cases, and despite the existence of important contextual differences, the CEC were 
4. The ICFES test (or the Saber test) is a standardized test administered to students of grades 3, 5, 9 and 11 by the 
Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la Educación Superior (ICFES 2010b). ICFES in 11th grade is compulsory in 
order to access tertiary education. However, universities are autonomous when it comes to weighing ICFES as an 
enrolment criterion: some universities use ICFES test results as the sole criterion for student admission; other 
universities combine it with interviews and tests; and other universities develop their own selection processes. 
For instance, according to Sánchez et al. (2002), the ICFES is used as the only tool for 83 percent of the public 
universities of Colombia; exams or interviews are also widely used. Besides being essential for university access, 
ICFES is also conceptualized as an accountability tool that might serve as the “main instrument” to improve the 
quality of education; in particular, the SED understood that the ICFES test should establish the situation of students 
in different grades and, in so doing, point to appropriate strategies and improvement plans for schools (Peña 
2005b: 29). In addition, due to the fact that CEC ICFES results are evaluated by the SED, these schools have strong 
incentives to strategically adapt their practices to the ICFES.
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built in vulnerable areas with low SES stratum (measured through the SISBEN system), 
since this program openly aimed to beneﬁ t poor students.5 The methodology section 
includes a broader explanation.
1.4 State of the Art of the CEC’s Previous Evaluations
In this section we review the evaluations of the CEC program made by the SED, 
international organizations and independent scholars. These evaluations have reached 
similar conclusions in relation to some aspects of the program such as the academic 
results of the CEC, the role of the CEC principal, teachers’ employment conditions, the 
infrastructures and services of the schools and the level of families’ attachment to the 
schools. In relation to others aspects, however, there is more controversy. We refer 
here to the analysis of pedagogical practices of the CEC, their student/teacher ratio, the 
funding and per capita cost of the CEC, and enrollment processes. Interestingly, existing 
assessments pay little attention to this last point, which is key to understanding whether 
the program achieves the objectives of positive action and non-discrimination. Table 2 
presents and summarizes the main results of most of the academic assessments of the 
CEC program.
Despite the multiple aspects in common with previous evaluations, our own research 
contradicts established assumptions on the superiority of learning achievement and 
school autonomy dynamics in Colegios en Concesión, as well as assumptions concerning 
the absence of screening practices within the CEC sector. 
5. Today, the 25 CEC in Bogotá enroll 39,947 students (2.7 percent of the total number of students in Bogotá). In 
some localities, the relative importance of CEC is greater: Usme (9 percent of total students and 11 percent of 
public students), Santá Fé (7.4 percent and 13.1 percent), Bosa (5.6 percent and 8.7 percent) and San Cristóbal (5.1 
percent and 7.5 percent). After its initial implementation in Bogotá, the CEC program was later expanded throughout 
Colombia (47 CEC in the rest of the country); the total CEC student population is calculated to be 67,680 (MEN 
2010: 102).
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Study, afﬁ liation and/or 
funding
Objectives Results
Duarte & Villa (2002a, 
2002b, 2002c and 2004)
—Inter-American 
Development Bank (BID)
Analyze the emergence, 
implementation and results 
of the CEC program in 
Bogotá
• CEC are more accountable than public schools.
• There is a perception of limited autonomy on the part of the principals (due to the EMO's 
centralism).
• The parents' participation is limited (although institutionally encouraged).
• Teachers are recruited ﬂ exibly.
• It is considered that per capita costs of CEC are US$ 475 and public schools are US$ 595.
Zuluaga & Bonilla (2006)
—Icesi University (Cali, 
Colombia)
Present a set of proposals to 
strength the role of schools 
in the elimination of poverty
• The CEC program increase coverage efﬁ ciently and, altogether, increase the quality of education.
• The private sector must play a more participatory role in the education system and, in particular, the 
CEC program should be extended throughout Colombia.
Peña (2005a and 2005b)
—former SED secretary. 
Fundación Empresarios por 
la Educación
Analyze the emergence, 
implementation and results 
of the CEC program in 
Bogotá
• The CEC program is deﬁ ned as a measure of positive discrimination, which planning included the 
accountability and the avoiding of the adverse selection of students.
• The CEC results are: better results in primary but not in secondary; the high parents' attachment; the 
generation of collective identity; better food than public schools; and the use of CEC's own distinctive 
pedagogical models. But, although the educational transference was intended, it has been necessary 
the recontextualization of the pedagogical projects.
• It is considered that per capita costs of both CS and public schools is US$ 473.
Barrera (2006 and 2009)
—World Bank and Harvard 
Graduate School of 
Education (Cambridge)
Analyze the CEC’s dropout 
rates; the impact of CEC 
on public schools near 
the concession; and the 
comparison between ICFES 
test scores among CEC and 
public schools (in Bogotá)
• The CEC have reduced students' dropout rates; and, also, there is “Some evidence of an indirect 
impact of the concession schools on the dropout rates in nearby regular public schools.” But only at 
90% of statistical signiﬁ cance.
• The CEC have a positive impact on test scores when compared with students in other public schools 
(in mathematics and biology, but not in reading or physics).
• The role of principal is more autonomous in CEC than in PS (i.e., in hiring and ﬁ ring teachers).
• The CEC have better infrastructure (physical plant, equipment) and services (i.e., food) than public 
schools.
Sarmiento & PNDH (2007)
—SED and Colombian 
Planning Department (DNP)
Evaluation of the educational 
public policies in Bogotá 
(2004–2006), including CEC
• Analysis of the costs and efﬁ ciency of CEC and public schools. The CEC average was US$ 418in 2003 
and 599 in 2006; while public schools average was 404 (2003) and 670 (2006).
Table 2—Academic assessments of the CEC program
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Study, afﬁ liation and/or 
funding
Objectives Results
Sarmiento (et al. 2005, 
2008)—Colombian Planning 
Department (DNP)
Evaluate and analyze the 
CEC program
• CEC enhance innovative and coherent pedagogy, while public schools a more traditional approach.
• CEC principals perceive limited management autonomy (there is similar dependency than public 
schools).
• The methods of selection of students are “similar” (but not identical): evidences of students' 
selection in CEC.
• CEC have more activities to inﬂ uence the community and parents. Parents participate moderately in 
CEC (but parents' participation in public schools is zero).
• CEC have improved in repetition, dropout and approval ratios (better than public schools).
• The principal has a more academic leadership in CEC, while having a more administrative role in 
public schools.
• CEC teachers have lower academic qualiﬁ cations than public schools teachers (and also worse 
employment conditions). And the CEC used the non-renewal of contract as a means of increasing the 
productivity of teachers.
• Public schools are more economically efﬁ cient than CEC.
• CEC increase parents' academic expectations.
• The ratio student-teacher average of CEC is considered to be 27,8.
• The per capita costs of CEC are US$ 512 (average 2002) and 424 (2003), while public schools are of 
364 (2002) and 311 (2003) -whit important differences among PS reported: from 211 to 369.
Patrinos, H. et al. (2009)
—World Bank
Literature review regarding 
the secondary education in 
PPPs in education, including 
CEC in Colombia
• The CEC program had lead to a diversiﬁ cation of the supply of education.
• The CEC program had attracted high-performing and specialized educational organizations which 
drive up the overall quality of the education provided.
• The CEC program enhances school management autonomy (being more accountable to the users, 
and increases the efﬁ ciency) and, also, pedagogical autonomy.
Pérez & Rivera (2010)
—Rosario University 
(Bogotá)
Case study of CEC Sabio 
Caldas
• The motivation of the EMO for participating to the CEC program was based on social vocation, 
religious image and prestige.
• The EMO was opposed to the imposition of the double full day.
• The students ﬁ nd several difﬁ culties (both economical and academical) when facing the access to 
university.
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Study, afﬁ liation and/or 
funding
Objectives Results
Bonilla (2010a and 2011)
—University of Maryland, 
and ICFES institute
Analyze the CEC’s impact on 
ICFES results (maths and 
verbal test scores)
• There are no signiﬁ cant differences among CEC and public schools ICFES test scores.
• The employment policies of CEC increase teachers' productivity.
• CEC don't use the teaching to the test.
Gómez et al. (2011)
—Catholic University of 
Colombia (Bogotá)
Case study of CEC Calasanz • Description of the CEC Calasanz's internal ﬁ nancial documents.
Bonilla Leonardo (2011)
—Bank of the Republic of 
Colombia
Evaluate if double school 
day effect on the quality of 
education in Colombia
• Full school day has been statistically signiﬁ cantly associated with ICFES results. Therefore, double 
school day creates inequality among students in a full school day (e.g., CEC students).
Barrera et al. (2012a)
—Barrera’s afﬁ liation is the 
WB, but the publication is 
afﬁ liated to University of los 
Andes (part of AAE)
Literature review regarding 
the secondary education in 
Colombia, including the CEC 
program
• CEC have more organizational autonomy than public schools (including the management of human 
resources); therefore CEC are more ﬂ exible than public schools.
• There are modest improvements in academic performance and in dropout ratios (although these 
effects are heterogeneous among EMOs).
Valencia & Carrizosa (2013)
—UNESCO
Analyze education on 
conﬂ ict resolution in AAE, 
Colsubsidio and Fenur
• The CEC emphasize discipline and control, but not living together.
• CEC promote participation, but the limits of institutional participation are undeﬁ ned. In practice, 
participation in CEC more nominal than substantive.
Vélez (2013)
—former SED secretary, 
on a conference organized by 
the American Development 
Bank (BID)
Analyze the planning, 
implementation and impact 
in Colombia of the CEC
• The aims of the project were: increasing the education supply and improve schools' quality, both 
in marginal areas with vulnerable population. And the program mechanisms were: the educational 
transference (from institutions of proven excellence); schools' autonomy; and accountability.
• The results of the CEC program had been the improvements in ICFES test and improvements in 
retention ratios.
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2. Methodology and the CEC Theory 
 of Change
In this section we describe the methodology (including the questions that had driven the 
research, the theoretical-methodological framework, and sample). 
2.1 The Realist Evaluation Approach
The questions that have guided this research project are: How different is the 
organizational and pedagogical approach of CEC in relation to regular public schools? 
Are the academic results of the CEC signiﬁ cantly different from the results of public 
schools operating under similar conditions? If so, why? 
In order to answer these questions, we rely on the realist evaluation approach (Pawson 
2006, Pawson & Tilley 1997), which considers public policies as hypotheses about 
social improvement, whose underlying assumptions need to be tested and unpacked. 
Accordingly, one ﬁ rst step in this methodology consists on constructing the “theory of 
change” (or program ontology) of the policy in question, as a way to treat such a theory 
as a set of policies that need to be tested in the ﬁ eld. In fact, this is what we do in the 
next section, where we (re)construct the CEC theory of change on the basis of secondary 
data and interviews with key informants. 
The realist evaluation approach understands public policies as part of social systems 
that, as such, may work in a selective way. In other words, public policies will have 
effects only if agents (both people and institutions) decide to make them work properly 
and, also, if they use the resources that they possess in the way that policy-makers and 
planners intended when they designed the policy program under evaluation. 
As a consequence, public policy analysis needs to capture the agents’ reﬂ exivity (their 
reasons, interpretations, strategies and elections), as well as the social values and 
interpretative frameworks of the actors in question. Then, our research is intended to 
focus on the preferences, interpretations and responses of different agents (such as 
local policy-makers, principals, teachers, parents and students) and on the contextual 
factors (such as the institutional and regulation context) or the socioeconomic space(s) 
within which the CEC are placed. We aim to understand “what works for whom in what 
circumstances and in what respects, and how” (Pawson & Tilley 2004: 2), and not only 
to understand whether “charter schools work (or not)” in an abstract way. 
2.2 The CEC’s Theory of Change
As a result of the analysis of interviews with key informants, it is possible to deduce 
that the CEC program was a “second best” policy option. Initially, the SED sought to 
create a more market-oriented model with more parental school choice capacity, greater 
competition between schools and operation by for-proﬁ t EMOs. In fact, the promoters 
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of the CEC program in the end of the nineties openly admitted that their initial intention 
was to emulate a “Chilean-like model” (Edwards 2014). 
The CEC theory of change would have looked very different if it meant the adoption of 
more drastic market rules. However, several constraints prevented this from happening, 
including the ﬁ erce opposition of teachers’ unions (Miñana 2010b, Peña 2005b, Villa & 
Duarte 2002b, Pardo Romero 2014)6 worried that the privatization of education would 
worsen teachers’ employment conditions. The worsening of teachers’ employment 
conditions could be the result of a fraudulent contracting scheme, failing to fulﬁ ll the 
Teachers Acts requirements.7
From the analysis of legal documents related to program planning, as well as analysis 
of interviews with key informants, it is possible to identify the main elements of the 
CEC’s theory of change: its core objectives, underlying mechanisms and legitimating 
principles.
The expected objectives of the program are to increase the academic performance of 
poor students, to diversify the pedagogical models of schools, and to increase the public 
school places in contexts with shortage of public places (Vélez 2013, Peña 2005a and 
2005b, Villa & Duarte 2002b):
• First, increasing the academic performance of poor students. This was supposed to 
be the result of the interaction between different factors: the proven academic success 
of the EMO; the high quality of the pedagogical approach (both elements evaluated 
during the tender process); and periodical SED evaluations, which controlled the 
extent to which CEC’s results were better than those of the nearby public schools 
(Barrera 2006 and 2009, Patrinos et al. 2009). 
• Second, increasing the pedagogical diversity of the local education system. This 
should be the result of the introduction of different education providers (with their 
different pedagogical approaches and traditions), which differ from the perceived 
homogeneous pedagogical models of public schools. 
• And, thirdly, the CEC should increase the educational coverage in contexts with a 
deﬁ cit of school places. And, also, do it quickly and cost-efﬁ ciently (Castro et al. 
2012, Peña 2005a and 2005b). 
6. The CEC program was made possible thanks to the personal involvement of mayors Mockus and Peñalosa, as well 
as the decisive intervention of Cecilia Vélez (who was Bogotá’s education secretary and later became minister of 
education of Colombia). Interviewed by B. Edwards (2014) Vélez stated that “Well obviously I had studied all cases: 
from Finland—which was public—to the Charters in the United States, and I had also studied much about the 
Chilean model. But we thought that the Chilean was not a generalizable scheme …. We were not able to make such a 
risky thing as Chile …. Despite we are moving closer toward a more market scheme, we still have many restrictions. 
Chile could do it because they had a dictatorship; in a democracy you cannot implement a scheme like Chile.”
7. Both public schools and CEC are governed by two Teachers Acts (the old 2277 act of 1979, and the new 1279 act 
of 2002) that establish a correspondence between teacher rank and salary. The two Teachers Acts have important 
differences in terms of access to the teaching profession as well as teachers’ evaluations and accountability. In the 
decree of 1979 only those who had a teaching degree could exercise the profession, whereas the new decree of 2002 
expanded the deﬁ nition of teachers. While this could have led to a change of the ethos of the profession (Miñana 
2010a), only 21 percent of the new teachers had not earned a teaching degree (Barrera et al. 2012: 14). Regarding 
evaluations and accountability, the new Act (2002) is supposedly more rigorous and performance-oriented (with 
performance evaluations and a standard test) compared to the 1979 Act (based on training and years of experience); 
in practice, however, this has not happened because evaluations have been performed less frequently than expected 
(only in 2010; Barrera et al. 2012: 13–14).
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To overcome these objectives the program assumed that three main “mechanisms” 
would be activated: autonomy, transference and institutional control (Vélez 2013, Villa 
& Duarte 2002a and 2002b):
• First, the program enhances schools’ autonomy (both pedagogical and managerial 
autonomy), which is one of the “ﬂ agships in the New Public Management 
educational toolkit” (Verger & Curran 2012: 4). On the one hand, as mentioned 
above, it is assumed that public schools offer a one-size-ﬁ ts-all homogeneous and 
monolithic pedagogical model. In comparison, the pedagogical autonomy given to 
CEC is expected to allow these schools to develop different, particular, and speciﬁ c 
educational projects (including various educational or religious approaches) 
more accountable to parents’ needs. The main outcome of the school autonomy 
dynamics is an expected increase in the diversity of the education providers. On 
the other hand, it is assumed that most public education system problems are of 
an administrative nature (i.e., SED’s inefﬁ cient bureaucracy, principals with neither 
sufﬁ cient powers nor managerial vision, or the excessive inﬂ uence of teachers’ labor 
unions). Managerial autonomy should allow CEC to be more efﬁ cient in resources 
management, particularly human resources management (Bonilla 2011, Villa & 
Duarte 2005, Patrinos et al. 2009), and promote the ﬁ gure of a more autonomous 
and managerial-oriented principal (Barrera 2006 and 2009, Barrera et al. 2012). For 
example, the autonomy to hire and ﬁ re teachers should allow for the creation of 
cohesive teacher teams and increased teacher productivity, due to the fact that their 
employment is linked to their results (Sarmiento 2008).
• Second, the program is based on the mechanism of knowledge transference, in 
which the EMOs are expected to transfer their pedagogical and management know-
how of proven success in different realities to the CEC and, accordingly, to the public 
sector (Castro et al. 2012, Peña 2005). As a corollary, the transference of models is 
based on the assumption that it is possible to apply a range of management and 
teaching systems in very different contexts, but with the same level of success (since 
some EMOs had experience only or primarily in high class and even elitist contexts) 
(Villa & Duarte 2002b).
• Third, the program relies on the mechanism of institutional control of the SED in 
terms of regulation, evaluation and accountability. This included the SED’s control of 
student enrollment (assuring that CEC would address the most vulnerable children; 
see Peña 2005b) and the SED’s periodical independent evaluations (controlling 
CEC material and academic standards, and expelling poor-performing EMOs of the 
program) (Villa & Duarte 2002b). 
• Finally, competition was considered, at least for some charter school advocates, 
as a mechanism derived from the implementation of the CEC. That is, the 
implementation of CEC should enhance the competition between providers within 
the “local education market.” The CEC program involves an ex ante competition 
among providers during the tendering process (Villa & Duarte 2002a, 2002b and 
2005, Patrinos et al. 2009). At the same time, the CEC increases the level of diversity 
within the local supply system and expands parental school choice options, which is 
something that “creates a potential competition effect that softens quality-reducing 
decisions” (Bonilla 2011: 36) and can contribute to improvements in nearby public 
schools (Barrera 2006: 4).
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The most important legitimating principle of the CEC program is the right of poor 
children to quality education, a positive action principle (Peña 2005b). In other words, 
the CEC should offer an excellent (private) education to the most marginalized (see 
Sarmiento 2005 and 2008). The SED’s monitoring of enrollment should ensure that 
this positive discrimination principle is met. Other legitimating principles were the 
parents’ right to choose among different types of schools, in pedagogical and religious 
terms (Jolly 2009). For example, the SED-CEC contract states that one of the aims of 
the contracts is “to contribute to the fulﬁ llment of the Article 68 of the Constitution that 
gives to the parents the right to educate their children.” Finally, the exclusion of for-proﬁ t 
operators also contributes to the program’s legitimation. Figure 1 illustrates the CEC’s 
theory of change.
Figure 1—CEC’s theory of change
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2.3 Methods and Sample
The realist evaluation is a reﬂ exive, comprehensive and non-positivist methodological 
approach that privileges a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. In 
particular, the methods used in this research are both qualitative and quantitative, 
including techniques such as semi-structured interviews, focal groups, questionnaires 
and analysis of secondary sources (as shown in Table 3). The construction of the research 
sample has focused on Bogotá’s CEC program (excluding the rest of Colombia’s CEC); 
this was due to the fact that Bogotá’s CEC were the ﬁ rst ones constructed in the country 
and, accordingly, have a longer trajectory. In addition, the Bogotá school system has 
some particular features such as a higher presence of private educational providers and 
a deﬁ cit of school places that make this city particularly relevant. 
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The sample’s construction includes both public and CEC schools from the same 
neighborhood in order to analyze their interaction within the local education system. 
In each school, we interviewed different stakeholders (owners, principals, teachers 
and parents) and conducted focus groups with students. We also administered a 
questionnaire to principals and teachers, and interviewed key informants at the policy 
level. As a result, the sample included both CEC and public schools from different Bogotá 
localities (speciﬁ cally Usaquen, Santa Fé, San Cristóbal, Usme, Bosa, Kennedy, Rafael 
Uribe, Engativá, Suba and Ciudad Bolívar).
Table 3—Techniques and ﬁ eldwork of the research project
Techniques Fieldwork
Literature review SED’s evaluations of CEC and academic literature on CEC and 
charter schools
Document analysis of legal 
contracts and bidding processes
Documents from four SED bidding processes (1999–2003); and 
the 25 contracts between the SED and each CEC
Interviews with key informants Interviews with six key informants: ex-secretary of the SED, 
ex-secretary of teachers’ labor union, current SED planning 
director, current SED education quality evaluator, and SED 
responsible for the initial implementation of CEC
Semi-structured interviews 
(in CEC and public schools)
83 semi-structured interviews: 13 school principals, 36 teachers 
and 31 parents
Focus groups for students 
(in CEC and public schools)
11 student focus groups
Questionnaires to school principals 
and teachers (in CEC and public 
schools)
1,086 questionnaires to school principals and teachers in CEC 
and public schools
Statistical analysis of ICFES test 
results of CEC and public schools
ICFES test results of 145 schools, both CEC and public. The 
sample8 was constructed including CEC schools and public 
schools located in the same geographical area. The ﬁ nal 
database includes the following information for each school: 
school type, ICFES 2013 results in different subjects, school day 
and socioeconomic category
8. The sample is constructed from the following sources: (a) The ICFES 2013 results and school day schedules from 
the website of the Institute ICFES-Saber; (b) Type of college from the website of the Institute ICFES-Saber and the 
application “Looking for school” from the MEN website; (c) Location (in localities and UPZ) is assigned using 
the SED’s school maps; and (d) Socio-economic classiﬁ cation of schools has been obtained through the Institute 
ICFES-Saber database. The Institute assigns a SES to each school through the Socio-Economic Index Level Student 
(INSEY), which takes into account the area of residence, housing characteristics, family educational level, occupation 
of father and mother, number of siblings, etc. The various features of the school’s students are grouped by a variant 
of the method of Principal Component Analysis. From this clustering, schools are assigned a category ranging from 
1 to 4 (ICFES 2010a: 12). 
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9. The differentiation among organizational and pedagogical levels are based on Lubienski (2001, 2009 and 2014) and 
OECD (2005 and 2014). Organizational-administrative changes could refer to marketing, enrollment processes, 
governance, authority of the principal, labor relations aspects (Lubienski 2009) or teacher collaboration, feedback 
mechanisms, evaluation and hiring, and external relations (OECD 2014). Pedagogical changes refer to pedagogical 
aspects, curriculum or ICT use (Lubienski 2009, based on OECD 2005) and also to teaching style, instructional 
practices, class organization, textbooks in classrooms, methods of assessment used in classrooms, availability and 
use of ICT, and provision of special education (OECD 2014).
10. Parents send a form with their school preferences to the SED, and the SED distributes students through the 
schools of the zone according to students’ individual characteristics (socio-economic stratum according to SISBEN, 
geographical area, vulnerability and familiar uniﬁ cation) and the availability of places in the schools of the zone in 
question.
11. There are two speciﬁ c situations where enrollment to CEC through ofﬁ cial procedures predominates. First, in cases 
of insufﬁ cient demand (which was usually the case in the beginning of the CEC program). And, second, when 
parents can enroll their children to a pre-school institution linked to the CEC. 
3. Main Results
We present in this section the main results of our research, which we structure in three 
main dimensions: organizational characteristics, pedagogical styles and academic 
results.9
3.1 CEC’s Organizational Characteristics
Here, we analyze the organizational characteristics of CEC, in terms of enrollment 
processes, autonomy, management of human resources (leadership styles, employment 
conditions, etc.), material resources (including food and/or full school day) and school-
community relationships. 
Enrollment Processes
In Bogotá school choice is restricted by a zone system and the CEC enrollment process 
appears similar to that of other public schools.10 In fact, in many cases, parents recur 
to the formal procedures to access CEC.11 However, as stated previously, demand for 
the CEC greatly exceed the places they can offer, which contributes to many CEC and 
families resorting to informal mechanisms in the process of enrollment. 
Parents habitually resort to informal communication with and pressures on school staff. 
More exceptionally, a few interviewees reported that parents go as far as purchasing 
places for their children. The 
CEC also resort to informal channels in the enrollment process. Since screening students 
is apparently not allowed, most CEC principals we interviewed emphasized that the 
selection process in their school is ruled solely by the priorities of the SED, plus the order 
of arrival. When asked directly, they denied the existence of any cream skimming or illegal 
selection practice. Nevertheless, according to our data, the presence of irregularities in 
the selection of students is quite common. In particular, our questionnaires show that 
68.1 percent of the CEC’s staff (principals, coordinators and teachers) consider the CEC 
principal to be a direct participant in student enrollment processes, whereas only 44.7 
percent consider the SED a direct participant in that process. In contrast, public school 
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staff stated that the SED is involved in 81.3 percent of enrollments and public school 
principals only 37.5 percent. These results could be due to teachers misunderstanding 
the selection rules. However, our qualitative ﬁ eldwork also shows that the CEC frequently 
select pupils who, in addition to meeting the requirements established by the SED, meet 
several of the following characteristics: member of a “structured” family, high learning 
motivation, good academic record in previous schools, and high scores in ability tests 
supplied ad hoc by the CEC to the candidates. 
The most common mechanisms through which CEC selection occurs are interviews with 
parents and students, visits by the school social worker to the potential student’s house, 
and consultation of academic records (including ability tests). These irregular practices 
were mentioned in interviews with families and students quite often:
“By the time I came to enroll my son, they interviewed me. They asked me ‘What do you think 
about this school?’ And the social worker and the secretary made me other questions.” 
—Parent 2 CEC 5, Bogotá, February 12, 2014
In particular, most parents and students we interviewed referred to processes of 
determining academic potential (via tests and consultation of previous academic 
records) as an intrinsic element of the enrollment process: 
“They asked me to show them the previous school’s report card.” 
—Parent 1 CEC 24, Bogotá, March 26, 2014
“We did a test. They asked us about the core subjects, such as mathematics, Spanish, English, 
physics, those subjects.”
—Focal group CEC 20, Bogotá, February 28, 2014
On the contrary, public schools are characterized as not selecting students. In fact, 
these schools have no choice but to accept and enroll students who have been rejected 
and expelled from CEC.
The selection of CEC students has been possible due to two major problems during the 
implementation of the program: a certain contractual ambiguity and lack of strict control 
from the SED.
In relation to contractual ambiguity, the 27th clause of the SED–CEC contracts (which 
speciﬁ es the process of student enrollment) can be interpreted in a ﬂ exible manner to 
allow the selection of students. In fact, there has been progressively more room for 
student selection in each tender; the last contracts are even more ambiguous than the 
ﬁ rst contracts. This manifested uncertainty has been criticized both by the current director 
of planning of the SED as well as the former SED coordinator of the CEC program: 
“If you read the bidding documents, the selection of students is an issue that is not sufﬁ ciently 
speciﬁ ed. In fact, there are three versions of bidding documents. In the ﬁ rst version, it seems that 
the Ministry of Education assigned quota students. The second version is ambiguous. And in the 
third version it is clear that schools can choose the students.” 
—Key informant, SED planning responsible, Bogotá, February 18, 2014
WORKING PAPER
Public-Private Partnerships In Colombian Education24
“In the contracts, the student selection is not anticipated. I do not know at what point they began 
to select pupils, but that was not written in the contracts.”
—Key informant, former responsible of CEC implementation, Bogotá, March 31, 2014
As some key informants revealed, the CEC’s selection practices are well-known among 
the planning ofﬁ ce of the SED.
The selection of students by the CEC has implications of a different nature. One of the 
most obvious (and concerning) relates to the alteration of the learning process and its 
outcomes, since the selection of brighter and more motivated students is expected to 
have positive academic consequences at the classroom level through the so-called “peer 
effect.” This is ironic, in the sense that the CEC program is based on the assumption 
that the school effect is more relevant than the context and social composition effect. 
However, it is clear that for many CEC managers, intervening proactively in the 
composition of their schools is perceived as a strategic asset to deliver good results. 
“So there is an effect such as [cream] skimming. Suddenly the CEC selected the poor but motivated 
students. CEC students are poor but motivated, unlike the [not motivated] poor students of nearby 
public schools.” 
—Key informant, SED planning responsable, Bogotá, February 18, 2014
“The CEC may present factors of choice and self-selection. These factors may be important. For 
example, the families of the CEC are generally more motivated than families who are in state 
education.”
—Key informant, SED evaluation responsable, Bogotá, March 4, 2014
Overall, cream skimming, despite does not necessarily mean a breach of the contract, is 
a violation of the spirit and the principles of the CEC original policy idea.
“In case there is selection of students, then it is necessary to investigate that. In other words, the 
selection of students is wrong. There may have been certain SED lassitude for allowing the CEC to 
choose their students.”
—Key informant, SED planning responsable, Bogotá, February 18, 2014
“In case there is selection of students, then it is necessary to investigate that. In other words, the 
selection of students is wrong. There may have been certain SED lassitude for allowing the CEC to 
choose their students.”
—Key informant, former responsible of CEC implementation, Bogotá, March 31, 2014
School Autonomy and Human Resources Management 
Both our qualitative and quantitative data indicate that CEC principals are quite 
autonomous in certain management aspects (such as hiring and ﬁ ring teachers). 
However, at the same time, the CEC are subordinated to the EMO in many other aspects, 
such as salary and budgetary issues. In comparison, public schools are characterized by 
a high dependence on the MEN/SED, and by a narrow margin of action of principals 
in most managerial aspects. Figure 4 in Appendix 2 details which actors in CEC and 
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public schools are responsible for management tasks such as hiring and ﬁ ring teachers, 
teacher salaries and budget assignation.
The CEC are autonomous when it comes to hiring and ﬁ ring teachers, but they are not 
supposed to be able to deﬁ ne teachers’ employment conditions because, like public 
schools, they are governed by the Teacher Acts of 1979 and 2002. Despite this, in 
practice, working conditions for CEC teachers are much worse than for teachers in public 
schools. Our teacher survey pointed to a range of questions related to labor conditions; 
responses are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4—Summary of teachers’ employment conditions in CEC and public schools
Public school CEC
Age, experience as a teacher, 
and years at the school
Age: 44.4
Exp.: 19.3
Years: 8.3
Age: 35.2
Exp.: 11.4
Years: 4
Rank Specialization: 48.7%
Master 15.2%
Professional: 69%
No correspondence rank-salary
Teacher Act 1979: 51%
2002: 28.7%
1979: 36.9%
2002: 63.1%
Workday (hours/week) at 
school and at a class
School: 30.3 
Class: 23.8
School: 42.9
Class: 31.2
Mode and time of recruitment Indeﬁ nite: 95% Temporary: 98.9% 
(of which 99% were less than a year)
Salary (in Minimum Wages 
[MW])
Between 2 and 6 
MW: 83.2%
2 or less MW: 66.5%
Important differences among EMOs
No correspondence rank-salary
Unions Yes: 77.1%
No: 22.9%
Yes: 0.7%
No: 99.3%
Source: Own elaboration based on our survey.
In the context of CEC, the 2002 Teacher Act is predominant (63.1 percent), while the 
1979 Teacher Act predominates in public schools (it applies to 51 percent of the teachers, 
while the 2002 Teacher Act applies to 28.7 percent of them). Thus, labor conditions 
are clearly worse in CEC, which tend to reﬂ ect lower ranks and salaries and potentially 
include professionals with no teaching degree. 
CEC teachers have a much longer workday than public school teachers: the former 
spend 42.9 hours per week in school (31.2 of those hours in the classroom), whereas 
public school teachers are in school only 30 hours per week (23.8 of those hours in 
the classroom). In addition, 87.3 percent of the public school teachers agreed with 
the statement “I have time to prepare my classes,” while only 68.4 percent of the CEC 
teachers agreed with it. 
CEC teachers’ contracts were temporal in almost all cases (98.9 percent). These 
contracts ranged in duration between 12 months (13.8 percent) and 11 months or less 
(85.6 percent), which means that few CEC teachers have paid summer holidays. In 
comparison, public school teachers had been hired indeﬁ nitely in 95 percent of the cases 
and had paid holidays.
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CEC teachers also reported lower salaries, although salaries vary substantially according 
to the EMO in charge: the EMOs with the lowest salaries are Fe y Alegría (90.5 percent 
of teachers between 1 and 2 minimum wages (MW), Cafam (85.5 percent), Fenur-Durán 
Dussán (80.7 percent), Alianza Educativa (79.5 percent), and Calasanz (78 percent). 
The EMOs with the highest salaries are Don Bosco (68.5 percent of teachers between 2 
and 4 MW), Colsubsidio (68.5 percent) and Gimnasio Moderno (41 percent) (for more 
detail about teachers’ salaries distributions among EMOs, see Figure 3 in Appendix 2). 
But, even in the three EMOs with the highest salaries, the salary is substantially lower 
than in public schools, where 23 percent of teachers are paid between 5 and 6 MW (this 
percentage is less than 2 percent in any EMO).
Overall, CEC teachers have lower degree qualiﬁ cations than teachers in public schools; 
the latter are staffed predominately by Professionals with Specialization and Master, 
whereas most CEC teachers are only Professional without specialization. This is partly 
due to the fact that CEC teachers overall are younger than public school teachers, but it 
has also to do with the fact that most of the CEC either do not recognize teachers’ ranks 
or limit them to a maximum. 
“Teachers in public schools are paid according to their teaching ranks. However, the CEC are not 
forced to pay in accordance with the Teachers Act. What did the CEC do? All CEC hired teachers 
in the 7th category [the lowest one]. That is, there is a cost economy at the expense of labor and 
professional rights of teachers. CEC teachers’ rights (labor right, economic and wage conditions) 
are not recognized.”
—Key informant, former SED secretary and FECODE leader, Bogotá, 11 March, 2014
“Does the school recognize your rank? Yes, but only up to grade 10, but not more.” 
—Teacher 2 CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
Finally, while most teaching staff is unionized in public schools (77.1 percent), labor 
unions are almost nonexistent in CEC (only 0.7 percent of CEC teachers are unionized).12 
Our qualitative data show that the exclusion of unions are a conscious EMO strategy to 
“ﬂ exibilize” teacher employment conditions in the CEC:
“When the CEC were implemented, that was another factor that was claimed: that public 
schools’ teachers obeyed more the guidance from the union than the guidelines of the Ministry of 
Education or of the schools’ principals. Therefore, it was considered that there was an excessive ... 
‘Fecodization.’”
—Key informant, former SED responsible and FECODE leader, Bogotá, March 11, 2014
“No, here are no trade unions, Colsubsidio is an enemy of the trade unions.”
—Principal CEC 12, Bogotá, February 4, 2014
Given their poorer working conditions, many CEC teachers would prefer to work in a 
public school: in our questionnaire, 42.2 percent of the CEC teachers reported having 
12. Animadversions between CEC and teachers’ unions are reciprocal. CEC are widely criticized by unions (ADE in 
Bogotá, FECODE in Colombia) for both political (CEC as an education privatization tool) and labor related reasons 
(worsening of the working conditions for CEC teachers).
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sought work in another school (whereas only 24.3 percent of public school teachers 
reported that they would prefer to work in a different school). Teachers from Fenur, Fe 
y Alegría and Don Bosco EMOs had searched for other teaching jobs most frequently 
(more than 50 percent of those teachers made this intention explicit). Colubsidio EMO 
had the lowest percentage (29.2 percent) of teachers looking for work in another school. 
Unsurprisingly, the CEC have a high level of staff turnover; among our respondents, 
years of experience averaged eight at the public schools and only four at the CEC. 
High turnover makes it difﬁ cult to consolidate cohesive teams and poses problems for 
relationships with students. Nonetheless, our qualitative ﬁ eldwork also highlights an 
ambivalent opinion about working in a CEC among teachers. The strong and majoritarian 
negative opinion on the bad employment conditions is combined with a certain positive 
valuation of the CEC in aspects such as pedagogical planning and training opportunities. 
In many cases, especially in religious schools, teachers described themselves as being 
profoundly attached to the ethos of the CEC.
Leadership Styles
Our data suggest that the CEC carry out more pedagogical and planning activities 
and enhance teacher-principal collaboration more than regular schools. In particular, 
the survey shows a statistically signiﬁ cant difference between public schools and CEC 
in terms of planning pedagogical activities (+18.5 percent of average difference, and 
generally low Cramer’s V Coefﬁ cient) such as: meetings on school vision and mission, 
deﬁ nition of the curriculum, class material, evaluation standards, collaboration with 
other colleagues and participation in in-service training. There are also signiﬁ cant 
differences in principal activities (+24.1 percent of average difference, and generally 
moderate and even strong Cramer’s V Coefﬁ cient) such as observation of teachers’ 
practices (and improvement suggestions) and collaboration with teachers (discussing 
goals, reinforcing their initiatives, solving problems together, etc.). For more detail, see 
Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix 2.
The high frequency (of both planning pedagogical activities and principal pedagogical 
activities in CEC) was emphasized in our interviews by both teachers and principals.
“In public schools, teachers do not plan. Then you go to school and do what you can in your area. 
No one checks your classes, you do not plan at all.”
—Principal CEC 22, Bogotá, February 25, 2014
“I had colleagues in state schools and they were teachers, coordinators and principals. They do not plan.”
—Teacher 3 CEC 22, Bogotá, February 27, 2014
The high presence of pedagogical activities in CEC can be explained by various reasons. 
First, by differences in labor conditions and hours per week: CEC teachers’ workdays are 
much longer. CEC teachers work 12.9 hours more per week (7.4 of those hours are spent 
in the classroom) than regular teachers in public schools, which increases their chances 
to spend more time on planning and teaching coordination. 
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Second, by differences in incentives schemes and training opportunities: CEC teachers 
are in a very weak employment position. According to our survey, while public school 
teachers have mostly indeﬁ nite contracts, almost 99 percent of the CEC teachers have 
a contract length of one year or less. Moreover, the relationship between teachers and 
principals in the public schools is mediated through the labor unions while, in contrast, 
unions are absent from the CEC sector. This weak employment position makes CEC 
teachers continuously threatened by the possibility of dismissal or non-renewal. This 
labor insecurity works as a great incentive for CEC teachers to adjust their productivity 
to the high CEC standards in terms of planning meetings and pedagogical sessions.
“Teachers in public schools are characterized by tranquility, relaxation, wellness. They think “I 
already got here, here they no longer exploit me.” And they provide an unethical answer: ‘I become 
the person who is late, dodging the day.’”
—Principal public school 3, Bogotá, July 11, 2014
“I was in both sides [public schools and CEC]. The quality is different in each side. There are bad 
teachers on all sides; but in the private school, if you’re bad, you get ﬁ red. Here [in the public 
sector], you mischief all you want and the only thing that they do is move you to another place [a 
different public school]. In the private sector, if you’re late, they’ll say ‘get active!’ In the state sector 
they do not tell you anything.”
—Teacher 2 public school 2, Bogotá, July 12, 2014
The continuity or non-renewal of CEC teachers, then, depends on the internal evaluation 
system of the CEC. Evaluation systems are also present in public schools, but they differ 
substantially from those in CEC. First, although public schools and CEC teachers are 
supposedly evaluated by the same system contemplated in the Teachers Act, the EMOs 
have generated their own and parallel mechanisms of teacher evaluation. Teachers with 
a negative evaluation according to the EMO system have many chances to not have their 
contract renewed. Another reason why evaluation in CEC and public schools is different 
is due to differences in the Teachers Acts that regulate their labor. As mentioned above, 
public school teachers are mostly hired through the old 1979 Act. In contrast, the CEC 
teachers are hired predominantly by the new 2002 Act (63.1 percent). The old 1979 
Teachers Act evaluation system is based, mainly, on in-service training and years of 
experience, while in the new evaluation system of the 2002 Act performance evaluations 
and standardized tests (which, supposedly, the principal applies on yearly basis) are 
also contemplated. 
Other less important differences in incentive schemes exist. Our survey shows that 73.3 
percent of the CEC teachers agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “the school 
offers me the chance to advance in my teaching career”; more than seven points above 
the public school teachers (66 percent). Also, CEC seem to offer more opportunities 
for continuous in-service training for their teachers. CEC teachers agreed more with the 
statement “at school there are opportunities to increase my training” (76.6 percent, 
compared to 69.4 percent of public school teachers) and “training opportunities are 
adequate” (80.2 percent in CEC, 67.6 percent in public schools). Nevertheless, though 
these elements could be considered positive incentives for teaching in the CEC system, 
both reﬂ ected a low statistical association (0.11 and 0.15 respectively).
Finally, a powerful narrative emerged during the ﬁ eldwork in which most CEC professionals 
(principals and directors) harshly criticized public school teachers. According to the 
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former, public school teachers just comply with the minimum requirements of their 
work schedule and are not as involved in students’ learning processes. They also afﬁ rm 
that public school teachers who work hard are negatively perceived by their peers, and 
that teacher absenteeism in public schools is a big issue (partly due to the supposedly 
great number of labor strikes). In fact, despite being quantitatively insigniﬁ cant, teacher 
strikes have acquired great political signiﬁ cance and are considered a key reason to 
favor the CEC model, especially by CEC students, families and staff. Ironically, despite 
the negative narrative about public school teachers, many CEC teachers want to work in 
a public school. 
 
Nevertheless, according to our questionnaire, there are not such vocational and 
motivational differences between public school and CEC teachers. In our survey, 
agreement with the statements “I enjoy being a teacher” and “I am happy working 
in this school” was 98.9 percent in public schools and 94.8 percent in CEC schools. 
Something similar happened with the assertion “If I could choose again, I would choose 
the teaching profession,” to which 94.7 percent of teachers in public schools and 88.7 
percent of teachers in CEC responded positively.
Material Resources and Services
CEC are well known for enjoying high quality facilities and material resources. CEC 
infrastructure, physical plant, and specialized equipment is modern and functional. Many 
CEC have audiovisual materials (TV, audio recorders), artistic resources (paint, clay, 
painting, decorative elements in the classroom), computers, Internet access, specialized 
rooms (library, games room, computer room, rooms for music events), etc., which in 
some cases are provided by the EMO itself. CEC infrastructure is usually much better than 
that of nearby public schools. To a great extent, infrastructure and equipment resources 
have played an important role in the prestige acquired by the CEC. In this sense, the 
CEC parents express great satisfaction with the infrastructure of the CEC that their kids 
attend. Their demands in this matter are few and restricted to more security (surveillance 
cameras, road safety in the vicinity of schools, etc.) or more green areas. 
Differences in the quality of the infrastructure between CEC and public schools are 
perceived by some as unfair: 
“How is it possible that the ﬁ rst time that the State builds a new school, well gifted, with good 
infrastructure ... they give it to private providers? Why does the State not give to them the old 
schools, the ancient ones, those without infrastructure?” 
—Key informant, former SED responsible and FECODE leader, Bogotá, March 11, 2014
Meanwhile, the CEC community, including parents, students and principals, believe that 
they take more care of the equipment and infrastructure than public school communities. 
According to the former stakeholders, this happens because CEC are stricter with their 
students (e.g., the CEC force students to pay for materials they break); because students 
and parents have a greater attachment to the CEC; and/or because CEC, on occasion, 
require students to collaborate in the maintenance of school facilities. Despite this 
narrative being very present in the interviews, it has not been possible to triangulate 
with other data sources.
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Regarding food and diet, CEC offer quality food and balanced diet to all students. Food is 
also considered to be better in CEC than in public schools.13 In fact, only 68.2 percent of 
students in public schools receive food (SED 2012). Food is an element that is especially 
appreciated by the CEC parents. This is not surprising because CEC are located in 
contexts with high levels of chronic malnutrition (Acosta 2012).
Regarding the school day, all CEC offer a full school day. In contrast, in 2013, only 0.8 
percent of public school students enjoyed a full school day; 51.3 percent attended only in 
the morning, 44.8 percent in the afternoon, 2.8 percent in the evening, and 0.3 percent 
on the weekend (SED 2014: 58). CEC families consider the full-day schedules profoundly 
positive, since long work days make it difﬁ cult for parents to monitor their children 
after school and the neighborhood is considered unsafe and violent. Nevertheless, this 
difference in the school day between public schools and CEC is considered discriminatory. 
According to Abel Rodríguez, leader of FECODE and former SED director:
“In the Council of Bogotá, I described this situation as discriminatory. Why are some kids going to 
full school day schools while others [the poor children] are going to a non-full school day? This is 
discriminatory.”
—Key informant, former SED responsible and FECODE leader, Bogotá, March 11, 2014
Abel Rodriguez, when in charge of the SED, aimed to offer more children the opportunity 
to have access to a full school day. With this purpose in mind, he allowed CEC to 
introduce a “double full school day.” This measure, apart from increasing the number 
of children enjoying a full school day, increased the supply of school places in locations 
with an important deﬁ cit of school places.
 
Most CEC joined this initiative and doubled their teaching schedule: a “morning full 
day” in combination with an “afternoon full day.” To allow this to happen, many had to 
incorporate the weekend to the school schedule and start classes as soon as 6:30 in the 
morning on weekdays.
The introduction of this double full school day generated both adhesion and resistance 
among the CEC. It generated adhesion because the measure allowed the schools to 
increase income substantially, since it virtually allowed them to double the number of 
students. But it generated resistance because of the logistical difﬁ culties involved and 
because it potentially reduced the full school day length for the students, whereby the 
initial spirit of the program could be partially lost. 
However, to better understand this last point it is important to have a more clear 
comprehension of how the school funding system works in Bogotá. 
13. The quality of food is a contractual requirement of the tender, and it is highly regulated. The “Annex V.—Food 
supply” of the 3rd tender (2002), for example, speciﬁ es the caloric intake of each element of the menu. However, 
according to SED (2013a) calculations, the public schools spend US$ 424.40 (20.3 percent of their budget) on food 
while CEC spend US$ 291.40 (27.2 percent). So, it is difﬁ cult to explain these differences in cost and quality terms; 
are differences due to economies of scale, economic efﬁ ciency, third party help, etc.?
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Funding
All public and CEC schools are funded according to the 2001 Act, which implements a 
per capita system of school funding. However, there are large ﬂ uctuations in the amount 
per student that each CEC receives from the SED. The SED-CEC contracts show that the 
EMO average was US$ 545 in the ﬁ rst bidding (1999–2003), with certain differences 
among EMOs (for instance, La Salle receives, per capita, only 75 percent of the average). 
These differences are related to the initial economic proposal submitted by the EMO 
to the bid (which counts for 10 percent of the total score of the proposal). Some EMO 
reduced the students’ per capita funding in the bidding proposal in order to become 
more competitive in the tendering process.
The contracts also specify how the per capita amount should evolve: “[the remuneration 
for pupil] will be set at the beginning of each year ... according to the inﬂ ation target 
has been ofﬁ cially adopted for the coming year the Board of the Bank of the Republic” 
(clause 31 of the CS–SED contracts).14 As Table 5 shows, the per capita amount received 
by CEC has evolved, accurately, according to the level of inﬂ ation in the country.
Table 5—Per capita amount at the beginning and at the end of the contract (in US$)
EMO Beginning of the contract 2014
Cafam 608.1 100.3 982.7 104.0
Fenur Duran D. 605.7 99.9 978.8 103.6
Don Bosco 602.0 99.3 972.8 102.9
Colsubsidio 608.1 100.3 982.7 104.0
Gimnasio Moderno 608.1 100.3 982.7 104.0
Calasanz* 545.0 101.1 984.0 104.2
Alianza Educativa* 550.5 101.2 994.0 105.2
La Salle** 371.0 74.9 711.2 75.3
Fé y Alegría*** 405.9 96.7 913.6 96.7
Average 544.9 100.0 944.7 100.0
Source: CEC–SED contracts. The beginning of the contract is 1999, except * = 2000, ** = 2002, *** = 2003.
Nevertheless, in ﬁ nancial terms, the most important problem for CEC is related to 
the evolution of teachers’ salaries, since salaries have risen more than the cumulative 
inﬂ ation over the period 1999 to 2014. Speciﬁ cally, teachers’ salaries have risen between 
+12.1 percent (rank 14) and +26.4 percent (rank 6) in the Teachers Statute of 1979, 
and between +5 percent (Normalist) and +124 percent (Licensed or professional with a 
Master or PhD) in the Teachers Statute of 2001 (for more detail, see Tables 14 and 15 of 
Appendix 2).
14. According to the Banco de la República de Colombia, inﬂ ation per year since 1999 has been: 9.2 percent (1999), 8.8 
percent (2000), 7.7 percent (2001), 7 percent (2002), 6.5 percent (2003), 5.5 percent (2004), 4.9 percent (2005), 4.5 
percent (2006), 5.7 percent (2007), 7.7 percent (2008), 2 percent (2009), 3.2 percent (2010), 3.7 percent (2011), 2.4 
percent (2012) and 1.9 percent (2013). These rates have been applied to the CEC funding system since the beginning 
of the contract with the SED.
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Methodologically speaking, it is difﬁ cult to compare the economic efﬁ ciency of the CEC 
and of the public schools. The ﬁ rst difﬁ culty is related to the SED not being able to reliably 
estimate the cost per student in all public schools yet; there is only one calculation 
attempt concerning the so-called 40*40 system: 40 hours a week and a teacher-student 
ratio of 40 (which in fact only affects 13 percent of the students in the public system). 
Table 6 presents the differences in costs among CEC and public schools 40*40. The 
per capita funding of the public schools 40*40 is US$ 2.091; in contrast, the per capita 
funding in CEC is only US$ 1.072 (almost 50 percent less than in public schools).
Table 6—Budget differences between public schools and CEC (in US$)
Public 40*40 (a) CEC (b) Difference (c) [c=a–b]
Human resources 1.146.5 54.80% 586.2 54.70% 560.3 54.97%
Physical plant, maintenance 140.6 6.70% 118.3 11.00% 22.2 2.18%
Material for students 272.0 13.00% 53.5 5.00% 218.5 21.43%
Administration 28.8 1.40% 22.0 2.10% 6.8 0.66%
Transport 78.6 3.80% 0.0 0.00% 78.6 7.71%
Food, nutritional support 424.4 20.30% 291.4 27.20% 133.0 13.05%
Total per capita 2.090.8 100.00% 1.071.5 100.00% 1.019.3 100.00%
Source: Own elaboration based on SED (2013a).
These important differences in budgeting are usually attributed to the inherently superior 
efﬁ ciency of the private sector in management of resources (Bonilla 2011, Villa & Duarte 
2005). However, when having a more careful look at the numbers, we realize that the 
budgetary differences are due to: 
a) Differences in internal expenses and budget priorities. As seen above, CEC pay 
substantially less in teacher salaries; in fact, this explains 55 percent of the budgeting 
differences of public schools and CEC. In this sense, wage policies (and the exclusion 
of unions) play a key role in the economic efﬁ ciency of the CEC. Furthermore, 
public schools give more budgetary priority to non-core education services (such 
as transportation, school supplies and food) than CEC. These services to students 
account for another 42 percent of the difference. 
b) Differences in funding sources. Most CEC beneﬁ t from additional external funding 
mechanisms (which are supplied by the EMO or by third institutions) such as 
scholarships, grants, technical or pedagogical counseling, support of external 
professionals, teacher-training courses, etc. The expenses related to these items are 
not necessarily contemplated in the yearly expenses of the school.
c) Differences in educational process costs. Last, but not least, as we have seen above, 
some CEC partially select the most motivated and academically bright students, 
who, to some extent, are “easier” and “cheaper to educate.”
School-Family and Community Relationship
Our data suggest that families participate frequently in the dynamic of the CEC and feel 
very involved with the school. In particular, our survey shows that teachers based in CEC 
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consider that families participate more in the school, and that families’ suggestions are 
taken into account more frequently than teachers from public schools (with a Cramer’s 
V Coefﬁ cient moderate in both cases) (see Table 16 in Appendix 2).
 
Our data suggests that parents’ participation has been encouraged by the CEC through 
parallel strategies, such as festivals and leisure activities (open days, parents’ days, bingo, 
etc.) and workshops and courses on different themes in the school. These courses are 
based on the idea that each CEC should impact its direct context; therefore CEC should 
be committed to educate both the students and the parents.
Nevertheless, parents’ institutional participation in CEC has been conﬁ ned to minor 
issues: collaborating in the maintenance of the school (e.g., planting trees) and fundraising 
for equipment and systems for the school (such as a sound system, a photocopier, etc.) 
through bingos, bazaars, markets, etc. In addition, institutional participation of families 
in CEC also has a predominantly informative character. Accordingly, it could be argued 
that this level of participation does not interpellate to the core of the decision-making 
processes concerning school organization, budget, educational process, etc.
The greater attachment of CEC families to the school could be partially explained because 
many of these families have gone through a selection process. The fact that families feel 
privileged and selected raises their level of motivation and appreciation regarding the 
school. 
 
Finally, our data also reveals that many CEC have had the capacity to generate a strong 
collective identity, which contributes to strengthening the attachment of parents and 
students to the school. The mechanisms favoring the creation of collective identity are: 
a) Organization of numerous extra-curricular activities, especially recreational and 
team building activities such as music bands, sports teams, etc. 
b) Consolidation of a CEC “brand” with its own aesthetics and symbolism, with 
uniforms playing a fundamental role. 
c) Intensiﬁ cation of the relations and exchange between students of different CEC who 
belong to the same EMO (or even with students of private schools managed by the 
EMO). 
d) The intensiﬁ cation of rituals, especially religious rituals. Furthermore, the nature of 
the CEC collective identity is constructed around the values of discipline, religion 
and so on, in contrast to the type of identity (or, better said, labeling, of public school 
students); while public school students are identiﬁ ed as louts or marginals (ñeras), 
CEC students are identiﬁ ed as quasi-posh (gomelos).
Finally, it is important to remark that, to some extent, the construction of such a collective 
identity is facilitated by the processes of student selection and exclusion. As we have 
seen, CEC select the more “able” students (academically bright, motivated, etc.) among 
the poor, and those with better family backgrounds. These same schools also tend to 
expel students who do not “ﬁ t” the school for academic or disciplinary reasons.  
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3.2 CEC’s Educational Styles
This part of the report focuses on the pedagogic characteristics of CEC and whether 
these schools experience intensive processes of educational innovation and pedagogic 
autonomy as compared to public schools.15
Pedagogical Autonomy
Quantitative and qualitative data show that the CEC have some autonomy from SED/
MEN, although school autonomy is also present to some degree in public schools. There 
is also a prominent role of the EMO as a central institution that deﬁ nes the pedagogic 
orientation of schools. The EMO has the power to deﬁ ne the pedagogic project and 
even speciﬁ c tasks such as the curriculum or the evaluation system of students. Figure 
4 in Appendix 2 shows which actors are important in pedagogical tasks, according to 
our questionnaire. It can be seen that CEC principals have a prominent role in student 
discipline and evaluation, while the EMO has a key role in subject content deﬁ nition 
and, especially, in pedagogical project elaboration. In comparison, in public schools the 
principal’s role is less important; the teachers are more important in student discipline, 
evaluation and subject content deﬁ nition. In addition, pedagogical project deﬁ nition 
in the public schools is the result of a collective and choral collaboration with the 
involvement of teachers, parents, principal and SED/MEN.
EMOs’ pedagogical central role is based on three main activities: (1) centralized 
elaboration of the pedagogical project of all afﬁ liated schools, (2) coordination of areas 
of knowledge, in-service training and successful projects, and (3) external assistance 
from partner foundations. Therefore, the EMO is actually the main actor deﬁ ning the 
pedagogic style of CEC schools. 
1) Regarding the centralized elaboration of the pedagogical project, most EMOs were 
especially active in the deﬁ nition of the pedagogical project or even the Institutional 
Educational Project (PEI) itself.16 This is the case of Colsubsidio, Don Bosco, AAE 
and Fe y Alegría, among others. 
“I was the assistant manager of Education in Comfenalco and I had the opportunity to develop the 
bidding proposal for the SED of these three schools [CEC: Nueva Roma, S. Vicente y S. Cayetano].”
—Principal CEC 12, Bogotá, February 4, 2014
“[All CEC Don Bosco] took the same approach, the same guidelines ... the same text, the same line.”
—Teacher 2 CEC 7, Bogotá, February 10, 2014
2) With regard to the coordination of planning and in-service training activities, the 
EMO normally enhances the coordination processes among areas of knowledge or 
course levels, with regular meetings for planning. Moreover, the EMO coordinates 
15. In any case, later we will discuss how the EMOs’ pedagogical models affect educational quality and/or academic results.
16. The central role of the EMO in the elaboration of the PEI entails a contradiction with Colombian legislation, as the 
PEI is considered strictly a school project: “every educational institution should develop and implement, with the 
participation of the educational community, an education project that expresses the way in which the school has 
decided to achieve the purposes of education as deﬁ ned by law, taking into account its social, economic and cultural 
environment” (Decree No. 1860, August 3, 1994, Art. 14).
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the in-service training by providing the same training courses to all teachers in the 
EMO’s schools (including training for ICFES tests preparation, ICT training, etc.). 
The EMO is also responsible for facilitating the exchange of successful projects and 
experiences among the CEC.
3) Finally, the EMO is responsible for providing external assistance from its allied 
foundations, which is particularly prominent in the case of Alianza Educativa. 
In particular, the private University of Los Andes and the private schools Nueva 
Granada, San Carlos and Los Nogales are clear references for providing support 
and technical assistance to the CEC. Alianza Educativa also centralizes the funding 
coming from external donors.
Educational Approach: Ethos and Values
Speciﬁ c values and ethos are a central characteristic of all the CEC. Despite notable 
heterogeneity among EMOs’ values, three key values appear to be central: religiosity, 
labor orientation and discipline.
Firstly, religiosity as a key value is not surprising since four of the nine EMOs are 
religious organizations (Don Bosco, Calasanz, Fe y Alegría and La Salle). This religious 
emphasis is expressed through several means, such as Catholic symbols decorating the 
schools, morning prayers, the act of blessing at breakfast and lunch, the presence of 
Mass and Eucharist, and even spiritual retreats. It is argued that these practices have a 
pastoral character (centered on values such as tolerance, solidarity and charity) rather 
than a theological character exclusively focused on the biblical message. For that reason, 
it is considered that this approach is appropriate for all students, including those who 
are non-religious. This is, of course, an important difference between CEC and public 
schools. Generally speaking, families value positively the religiosity of the CEC.
Secondly, labor orientation and entrepreneurship (such as compensation funds) have 
emerged as central values for some EMOs. In most cases, CEC are characterized by 
tasks of labor orientation. For instance, although both public schools and CEC have a 
relationship with the SENA vocational training service in the upper grades (9 to 11), the 
relationship is particularly intense in the case of CEC. In addition, some EMOs prepare 
students for employment, as in the case of Colsubsidio, through programs such as “Life 
Project,” “Community-company Project” and “Research Project.” Though conceived as 
holistic educational programs with emphasis on self-esteem, self-projection or conﬂ ict 
resolution, these projects focus on labor insertion and entrepreneurship. All of them are 
cross-curriculum projects and they cover almost all grades (in some CEC, from grades 
0 to 11). Students present their entrepreneurial projects in the “Business Expo” that 
takes place when they are in grade 11. Exceptionally, some projects have been effectively 
implemented in the local economy. The goal is to facilitate the autonomous work of 
students, an idea that is embraced by both teachers and parents.
“The idea is that students do not leave school to be employed, but have their own business.”
—Teacher 3 CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
“Students have to turn in people able to go out tomorrow from here and form his own company.” 
—Parent 3 CEC 12, Bogotá, February 26, 2014
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Actually, Colsubsidio’s institutional framework states that the objective of the EMO 
is to “offer quality education for a holistic training of people with intellectual, social 
and productive competencies” and to ensure that graduates are “people with a solid 
training in the ethical, scientiﬁ c, technological and cultural domains” (Colsubsidio 2012: 
5; emphasis added). There is no aggregate data on the labor insertion of Colsubsidio 
graduates. However, data from San Vicente School indicates that students who have 
become salaried employee (91 percent) are much higher than those that have become 
autonomous entrepreneurs (9 percent). 
Finally, a third pedagogical characteristic of CEC is discipline, a polysemic concept 
including various meanings. Discipline means, ﬁ rst, “urbanity” and respect for authority 
(teachers, parents and police). Discipline is also used as a synonym of security (less 
violence, fewer burglaries or thefts, etc.). And, thirdly, discipline means also a strict way 
to wear the uniform, a rule that also contrasts with public schools. In these three realms 
of discipline17 it is broadly assumed that CEC students are more disciplined than public 
school students. It is noteworthy that CEC parents show great commitment to these 
values.18
Teaching Practices
Teachers, principals and students stated that teaching practices of CEC are characterized 
by active teaching and applied knowledge. Moreover, in CEC, the student has an 
active role; students are protagonists of the learning process: teaching activities start 
from students’ own knowledge, using dialogic techniques (recursive style, Maieutics, 
questioning strategies, etc.). Thus, the focus of the learning process is the child, so CEC 
teachers have more the role of counselor or guide and their practice is less traditional 
and less based on memorization. CEC teachers also stated that they develop a practice 
that is applied and context-based, and not merely theoretical or abstract. For instance, 
they do experiments in science subjects or they seek immediate memory and experience 
in teaching history. 
Also, CEC teachers argue that they promote cooperative work rather than individual work. 
They also assert the use of a transversal and cross-curriculum approach, overcoming 
discipline-based teaching. This transversal approach is particularly evident in some 
career guidance programs (academic orientation, labor orientation and even personal 
17. This conception of discipline as authority could be part of a process of internalization of subjectivities 
(“normalization”) within an environment of disciplined institutional punishment (following the Foucaultian 
framework, as in Ball 2012b and 2013). Moreover, according to Olmedo (2014) and also using these Foucaultian 
analytical tools, neoliberal logic has enhanced the role of the market as a central mechanism of social regulation. 
Under this neoliberal “governmentality” (Foucault 1991), the market has subsequently become a disciplinary 
institution aimed to rule and guide—in a subtle and indirect way—more than dominate. Using this framework, it is 
possible to assume that the CEC are an environment of institutionalized discipline, aiming to guide and rule (more 
than dominate) through the construction of new subjectivities.
18. However, it is also true that, according to some authors, these practices might actually challenge some aspects of 
the public character of CEC. It can be questioned whether the emphasis on the pastoral approach of many schools 
challenges the secular character of the public education system (as stated by FECODE; see CEID 2014)—or it is 
simply an effective response to the religious diversity of pupils (Bidegain 2005). Also, strict discipline and models of 
authority cast doubt on whether this approach reinforces a good school climate, self-respect and disciplinary values 
(Valencia & Carrizosa 2013) or perhaps challenges the more rights-based system of public schools. In any case, 
there is no doubt that CEC religiosity has been considered a positive aspect by most CEC parents; Colombia has 
an important presence of Catholicism, Protestantism—Evangelism and Pentecostalism (Bidegain 2005, Rondón 
2007).
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orientation). At the same time, CEC teachers also recognize difﬁ culties for implementing 
these practices, such as the fact that cooperative work makes students easily distracted 
and can generate some problems related to controlling students. Teachers also accept 
that cross-curriculum approaches are easier to implement in some areas of knowledge, 
but more difﬁ cult in others.19 
It is assumed that student/teacher ratio determines the possibility of applying 
individualized pedagogical techniques. Therefore, the CEC’s high student/teacher ratio 
is negatively perceived. Although there is a lack of accurate data, it is clear that the CEC 
have a high student/teacher ratio, and higher than public schools. Public schools have, 
on average, a student/teacher ratio of 27 in preschool, between 32 and 35 in primary 
education, and 31 in secondary and medium education (Veeduria Distrial 2011, SED 
2012); the total average is 31. In contrast, our data indicate that the student/teacher ratio 
in the CEC is estimated at more than 45 students per classroom in grades 1 to 11, and 
around 35 in preschool (see Table 17 in Appendix 2 for more detail). 
The active and innovative teaching practice described in the CEC contrasts with intensive 
teaching to the test (also called “simulations,” “student ICFES training,” “clubs ICFES,” 
“pre-ICFES,” etc.). Pre-ICFES begins in early grades and becomes more intensive 
between grades 9 and 11 (ICFES tests are performed in grades 5, 7 and 9). This training 
can be done by CEC teachers themselves (teaching to the test is part of in-service teacher 
training) or by external agents (e.g., private ﬁ rms or other EMOs, such as Colsusbdio). 
The latter might imply some costs for the family. 
 
The emphasis on ICFES testing stems from two main reasons: 1) ICFES results are a key 
element in the CEC evaluations carried out by the SED, and 2) students’ ICFES results 
condition their academic continuity in post-compulsory education. This emphasis is not 
exclusive to the CEC; in fact, public schools also use teaching to the test, sometimes as 
a result of pressures from the SED. In both CEC and public schools there is an internal 
debate about the appropriateness of teaching to the test. Questions such as what is 
really being measured through a standardized test, how the practice of ICFES tests 
impedes other educational practices (i.e., values education), and how fair it is to use 
the same test for children with very different social and family backgrounds are central 
aspects of this debate.
The Impact of the Context on Teaching Practices
The design of the Colombian CEC program assumes that the know-how, management 
and pedagogical expertise of contrasted and high-quality educational providers, usually 
developed in wealthier contexts, can be transferred to the worst off. This assumption 
is strongly questioned by reality. Different social contexts do clearly shape the everyday 
practice of schools, and the CEC are not an exception.
It is noteworthy that the social contexts in which CEC are located are highly diverse. 
Despite the fact that all of these schools are situated in contexts with generally poorer 
19. The absence of ethnography prevents delving into these issues (therefore these claims should be taken with caution). 
However, it is also true that these claims regarding active teaching and applied knowledge could be related to the 
high incidence of pedagogical activities in CECs.
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SES than the Bogotá average,20 each context has its own dynamics in terms of economic 
deprivation and exclusion, frequency of drug trafﬁ cking and drug use, existence of violent 
youth gangs (pandillismo and barras bravas), presence of “dysfunctional” families (single 
parent families, young motherhood, domestic violence, absent parents, etc.), impact of 
political conﬂ ict (occasional presence of guerrillas and/or people displaced by violence), 
etc. So, despite the apparent homogeneity of the social strata, CEC are inserted into very 
different environments. Our data show that these differences are clearly perceived by 
CEC principals and teachers, who point out how the social realities of their particular 
school environment inﬂ uence their teaching practices.
 
Awareness of contextual differences is especially acute among different CEC of the same 
EMO: 
“The school [AAE] Atalayas had created an academic environment, discipline, coexistence, since its 
inception. In that school it is easy to do academia because everything else was already underway. 
The school [AAE] Jaime Garzón has many university parents; therefore, the academic level is high. 
In this school, [AAE] La Giralda, the context is typically composed by single mothers living washing 
clothes, recyclers some little delinquents. The school environment is more complicated. To build 
academics you have to prior ﬁ ght it—and it is strong.”
—Principal CEC 20, Bogotá, February 25, 2014
“The contexts of Colsubsidio schools are very different. The CEC San Cayetano is more vulnerable, 
has more poverty, more dropouts. It is more dysfunctional than the localities of Victoria or Nueva 
Roma. These localities are more central, here we are in a more rural context. Here, the students 
have a strong problem of vandalism.”
—Teacher 3 CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
Both CEC teachers and principals believe that socioeconomic background has an effect 
on learning processes, especially in terms of convivial and violence issues or parental 
relationships with the school (parents’ expectations on academic continuity, collaboration 
and attachment to the school values, time availability, etc.). These differences compel 
teachers to review their teaching practice. Aspects such as career guidance programs 
or convivial strategies (conﬂ ict resolution courses, discipline and respect to authority 
rules) receive special attention in the most unstructured contexts. According to our key 
informants, such pedagogical readjustment was not initially considered in the design of 
the CEC program:
“The original [CEC] idea was that a pedagogical model that had worked well for the intelligentsia 
class could be developed in popular sectors. For us it was not a traumatic landing, because we [Fe 
y Alegría] have been working in the popular sectors all our life. [However] the comments we hear 
[from other EMOs] was that it was very difﬁ cult to translate a model to another context with totally 
different conditions.”
—Key informant, EMO Fe y Alegría director, Bogotá, February 4, 2014
20. According to SED (2013), while the Bogotá average of SIBSEN stratum 0, 1 and 2 covers 46.3 percent of the total 
population, most of the CEC are located in localities with a higher percentage of these poorer stratum (i.e., Usme, 
San Cristóbal, Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar and Sumapaz—more than 80 percent; Santa Fé, Tunjuelito, Kennedy, La 
Candelaria and Rafael Uribe—more than 50 percent). However, it is also true that within localities there is signiﬁ cant 
internal economic diversity, so the data SISBEN aggregate has only an approximate value.
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 “To AAE work in groups of 10 to 12 students, who were already literate, was very different to face 
courses of 35 to 40 students. Someone from the University of the Andes once told me ... ‘You know 
what? Understand the baccalaureate, understand all these problems has led to us to change our 
curricula here … Education is not only a school, or the teachers, but is also associated factors such 
as the socioeconomic conditions. That is: you cannot transfer the Los Nogales school model, which 
is one of the most expensive schools in Colombia, to Ciudad Bolivar.’”
—Key informant, initial responsible of CEC implementation, Bogotá, March 31, 2014
Obviously, the social context impacts educational results, so most actors recognize that 
you cannot expect the same results for all students.
“[AAE] Miravalle have very high [ICFES] tests results. My daughter is studying there and she tells 
me ... ‘we have very high [ICFES] test results’, and I say ‘but the context is different.’”
—Teacher 2 CEC 20, February 28, 2014
3.3 Academic Differences between CEC and Public Schools
This section of the report explores the differences among CEC and public schools in 
terms of academic outcomes, including ICFES test results, internal efﬁ ciency (such as 
approval, repetition and dropout rates), and academic continuity.
ICFES Results
ICFES results are the single source to evaluate the impact of CEC schools on academic 
performance compared to public schools. The ICFES results of 2011 show the academic 
results advantage of private and subsidized private schools, but the interest for this 
research is the comparison between public and CEC schools. ICFES results show that 
more CEC schools are located at a “superior” level of performance (28 percent) than 
public schools (11 percent). At the same time, only 3 percent of CEC schools have low 
levels of performance in comparison with 8 percent of public schools (for more detail 
related to ICFES results by school, see Figure 5 in Appendix 2). However, this direct 
comparison is not very informative because there is a methodological problem of 
endogeneity; key independent variables such as students’ socioeconomic background 
and school day length are correlated with school type.21 
To overcome these limitations, a statistical analysis of the ICFES results of 145 public and 
CEC schools (see the details on the sample construction in the methodology section) 
was carried out. The sample includes the 25 CEC of Bogotá (17.2 percent of the sample) 
and 120 public schools (82.8 percent). Table 7 shows that 37 schools (25.5 percent) of 
the sample teach the full school day, while 49 schools(33.8 percent) teach only in the 
21. This endogeneity is recognized by the person responsible for the SED evaluation, who recognized the challenges of 
proper comparison: “ahí tampoco la relación es justa, porque si comparamos los resultados de 25 colegios [CEC], 
contra los resultados de 359 colegios [distritales], la proporción y las poblaciones no son las mimas; una lógica más 
equitativa sería equiparar los resultados de esos 25 [CEC] con colegios [distritales] que tiene por ejemplo el mismo 
tipo de jornada que los de concesión, y ahí la lógica no funciona igual porque demostramos que en esos colegios 
que tienen la jornada única el resultado en las pruebas ICFES es mayor que en los colegios en concesión” (Key 
informant SED evaluation responsable, Bogotá, March 4, 2014).
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morning, 53 (36.6 percent) in the afternoon, and 6 (4.1 percent) in the evening. All CEC 
teach the full school day. The SES of the sample is 1 in 20 cases (13.8 percent), 2 in 102 
cases (70.3 percent), and 3 in 8 cases (5.5 percent). The CEC are more concentrated in 
the SES 2, while the public schools of the sample reﬂ ect the three SES categories. 
 
Table 7—Characteristics of the sample: type of school, school day and schools by SES
School day SES
Incomplete Complete Total 1 2 3 Total
Public schools 108 
(90%)
12 
(10%)
120 
(100%)
19 
(18.1%)
78 
(74.3%)
8 (7.6%) 105 
(100%)
CEC 0 
(0%)
25 
(100%)
25 
(100%)
1 
(4%)
24 
(96%)
0 
(0%)
25 
(100%)
Total 108 
(74.5%)
37 
(25.5%)
145 
(100%)
20 
(15.4%)
102 
(78.5%)
8 
(6.2%)
130 
(100%)
Source: Own elaboration based on ICFES.
Table 8 illustrates ICFES results by school type, school day and socioeconomic category. 
As can be observed:
a) CEC have, on average, higher ICFES results than public schools. 
b) Schools teaching the full day have, on average, higher ICFES results than other 
schools. 
c) SES 3 schools have, on average, higher ICFES results than SES 2 schools (which 
have, on average, higher results than SES 1 schools).
Table 8—ICFES results in all subjects by type of school, school day and SES
Math. Chemis. Physics Biolog. Philoso. Engl. Span. S. know. Average 
Type CEC 46.8 47.6 46.8 46.5 41.7 45.7 49.3 47.1 46.4
Public s. 45.6 45.6 44.1 45.2 40.9 43.4 46.9 44.7 44.6
School 
day
Full day 47.2 47.6 46.5 46.7 42.4 46.3 49.5 47.4 46.9
Morning 46.0 45.8 44.2 45.4 40.8 43.6 47.2 45.0 44.9
Afternoon 45.1 45.4 44.0 44.9 40.4 42.9 46.4 44.1 44.0
Evening 42.2 43.0 41.7 43.0 37.8 39.6 44.5 42.5 41.6
SES 1 43.0 43.8 43.1 43.5 38.7 41.5 45.5 43.1 42.8
2 45.9 46.1 44.6 45.5 41.1 43.9 47.4 45.2 45.0
3 50.4 50.0 48.6 48.8 44.7 49.4 50.9 49.2 49.0
Source: Own elaboration based on ICFES 2013.
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Table 9 presents the results of the ANOVA test, which was carried out to determine 
whether differences in ICFES results for each independent variable were statistically 
signiﬁ cant. There are signiﬁ cant differences for all subjects when SES is taken as an 
independent variable, as well as when school day is taken as an independent variable. 
However, when “type of school” is the independent variable two subjects show no 
signiﬁ cant differences (mathematics and philosophy). Finally, the F-test values of school 
day and SES are always higher than the F-test values of “type of school.” 
Table 9—F-Test one way variance (F values and signiﬁ cation)
Math. Chemis. Physics Biology Philosophy English Spanish Social Kn.
Type 3.26 13.279* 24.199* 6.678* 2.647 10.626* 27.248* 18.569*
Day 24.084* 41.639* 62.183* 28.170* 20.523* 39.089* 66.666* 48.916*
SES 42.936* 39.108* 27.292* 37.759* 48.830* 40.121* 38.535* 36.436*
Note: * Signiﬁ cant with 95% conﬁ dence (>0,05).
To assess the importance of the effects of each independent variable on ICFES results, a 
linear regression analysis was carried out. Two models were developed: model 1 includes 
one independent variable (type of school), and model 2 includes the three independent 
variables (type of school, school day and SES). By developing these regressions we can 
observe whether the effect of “type of school” is still signiﬁ cant after controlling for 
school day and the socioeconomic background of the students. 
As shown in Table 10, in model 1, type of school is statistically signiﬁ cant in seven 
of eight subjects. Only in the subject of philosophy is the type of school coefﬁ cient 
not signiﬁ cant. However, in model 2, type of school is not signiﬁ cant in seven of eight 
cases. In fact, it is only signiﬁ cant in mathematics, but not in any of the other subjects 
assessed. That means that when other independent variables (school day and SES) are 
introduced into the analysis, the impact of the type of school practically disappears.
As expected, full school day coefﬁ cient is always positive. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that schools with a full school day obtain better ICFES results than schools teaching half 
school days. As expected, both SES 1 and SES 2 have a negative coefﬁ cient, meaning 
that a school with students from the lowest SES have worse ICFES results than schools 
comprised of students from SES 2 and SES 3. However, type of school is negatively 
statistically signiﬁ cant in mathematics, meaning that CEC schooling predicts worse 
ICFES results in mathematics than public schooling (other independent variables being 
equal). There are other cases where type of school has a negative value, but they are not 
statistically signiﬁ cant.
In conclusion, the analysis shows that school day and SES are both more inﬂ uential on 
schools’ ICFES results than type of school.
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Table 10—Multiple linear regression analysis of ICFES results (model 1 with one independent variable and model 2 with three independent variables; 
Coefﬁ cient B and standard errors in brackets)
Mathematics Chemistry Physics Biology Philosophy English Spanish Social 
Knowledge
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Constant 150,63* 47,905*
(1,121)
184,28* 48,370*
(0,934)
192,25* 47,251*
(0,876)
206,78* 47,462*
(0,837)
175,83* 43,072*
(0,860)
145,229* 47,730*
(1,115)
231,07* 49,762*
(0,754)
183,78* 47,837*
(0,918)
Type of 
school
1,986* –2,516*
(1,190)
3,592* –0,407
(0,992)
4,997* 0,753
(0,931)
2,650* –0,741
(0,889)
1,762 –1,544
(0,913)
3,229* –0,154
(1,184)
5,312* 0,871
(0,800)
4,393* 0,376
(0,975)
School day — 3,995*
(1,072)
— 2,574*
(0,894)
— 2,126*
(0,838)
— 2,165*
(0,801)
— 2,534*
(0,822)
— 2,614*
(1,066)
— 1,739*
(0,721)
— 2,241*
(0,879)
SES 1 — –5,404*
(1,202)
— –4,925*
(1,002)
— –4,556*
(0,940)
— –4,209*
(0,898)
— –4,669*
(0,922)
— –6,608*
(1,196)
— –4,560*
(0,809)
— –5,093*
(0,985)
SES 2 — –2,447*
(1,140)
— –2,823*
(0,951)
— –3,331*
(0,892)
— –2,363*
(0,852)
— –2,305*
(0,875)
— –4,445*
(1,134)
— -2,979*
(0,767)
— 3,254*
(0,935)
Adjusted R2 0,022 0,340 0,084 0,361 0,157 0,399 0,045 0,312 0,016 0,336 0,068 0,366 0,174 0,442 0,124 0,388
Notes: Type of school: public schools = 0; CEC = 1
School day: no full day = 0; full day = 1
SES category of reference = SES 3
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Approval, Repetition and Dropout Rates
This section examines differences in other educational indicators between CEC and 
public schools (for more detail, see Tables 18 and 19 in Appendix 2). The most salient 
indicators reveal that:
a) CEC have more approvals than public schools (+6.9 percent), due to the higher 
approval rate in lower and upper secondary (preschool and primary education 
approval rates are relatively similar).
b) CEC schools have less repetition (–2.3 percent), due to lower repetition rates in 
secondary education. 
c) CEC schools show less dropout (–3.7 percent); in this case the differences in 
preschool and primary education are also important.
Unfortunately, no disaggregated data include socioeconomic conditions or school day. 
This makes the comparison between CEC and public schools a biased one, and allows 
only a merely descriptive analysis. In addition, these indicators have to do with the 
internal systems of evaluation of schools, so they cannot be as objective as the ICFES 
exam is, for instance. 
Academic Continuity
There is no consistent data on academic continuity in the CEC. However, data from 
two EMOs, Alianza Educativa and CEC Colsubsidio San Vicente, offers some data on 
students’ academic continuity. In these cases, the CEC students present high academic 
continuity in post-compulsory education (both university and VET): 65 percent for 
Alianza Educativa graduates and 64.6 percent for Colsubsisdio San Vicente graduates. 
However, the CEC students showed a high preference for VET careers (which includes 
the “professional technical” and “technologist” specialties); these paths accounted for 
54 percent of AAE students who continued studying and 58 percent of Colsubsidio San 
Vicente students who continued studying. In comparison, access to university is less 
than half (42 to 45 percent).22 The comparison is obviously biased (because there is no 
disaggregated data by SES level), but it is interesting to note that CEC students showed 
more preference for technical careers and less for university than the Colombian average. 
Our qualitative ﬁ eldwork supports the hypotheses that the CEC enhanced articulation 
with vocational programs and continuity to VET institutions, more than to university, 
through these mechanisms: 
a) Articulation with vocational programs such as SENA, which presuppose a more 
direct labor insertion and are less academically oriented and less costly.
b) Some EMOs provide partial grants for students’ VET continuity. 
c) Orientation and counseling activities that increase expectations of academic 
continuity for both CEC families and CEC students. Principals and teachers highlight 
the difﬁ culties of this task, due to families’ skepticism and low expectations, as well 
as structural limits: access to university for these students is highly unlikely due to 
economic barriers and academic difﬁ culties. 
22. See Table 19 of Appendix 2. 
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d) Labor insertion for Colsubsidio students is a relatively high 29.2 percent. However, 
and in spite of its rhetoric of entrepreneurship, students from CEC Colsubsidio San 
Vicente became salaried employees (155 cases, 91 percent) rather than autonomous 
entrepreneurs (9 percent).
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4. Conclusions 
This research made use of a realistic evaluation approach to analyze the CEC in Bogotá. 
Our analysis tested to what extent our observation of the enactment of the program 
in real situations is consistent with the assumptions of the program theory of change 
(its objectives, mechanisms and legitimating principles). To achieve this objective, this 
report has tried to respond to the following questions: How different is the organizational 
and pedagogical approach of CEC in relation to regular public schools? Are the academic 
results of the CEC signiﬁ cantly different from the results of public schools operating 
under similar conditions? If so, why? 
Despite our focus on the particular case of the CEC in Bogotá as a paradigmatic model 
of charter school programming (see, for instance, Villa & Duarte 2002a, 2002b and 
2002c, Barrera 2006 and 2009, Barrera et al. 2012, Patrinos et al. 2009), our ﬁ ndings 
directly interpellate to broader debates regarding the potential and limitations of the 
charter schools model in ongoing global education reform processes.
4.1 CEC’s Organizational Characteristics
Pedagogical and administrative autonomy is conceived as a source of educational 
effectiveness within the CEC theory of change (Vélez 2013, Bonilla 2011, Villa & Duarte 
2005a and 2005b, Barrera 2006 and 2009, Barrera et al. 2012). Our study has showed 
that, both in pedagogical and organizational aspects, CEC have more autonomy from 
the SED/Ministry of Education than public schools, but they are also highly dependent 
on the EMO in many aspects.
A key actor in pedagogical aspects, the EMO elaborates the pedagogical project of its 
schools, deﬁ nes the main values of the educational project, and assumes the coordination 
between areas of knowledge and all processes of in-service training.23 This pedagogical 
autonomy was supposed to be conducive to the development of speciﬁ c educational 
projects that would be more accountable to parents’ needs and preferences. However, 
although our data shows that CEC parents participate intensively in the everyday life 
of the school, their institutional participation is limited to minor issues (usually of an 
informative character), and is rather scarce when it comes to the deﬁ nition of substantial 
aspects of the school life–curriculum or school organization. In any case, participation 
in schools is highly dependent on the social origin of students’ families, both in CEC and 
in public schools.24 
 
The EMOs take decisions on several aspects of CEC organization, some of which should 
lie on the principals. EMOs decide the elaboration of the initial economic proposal of 
23. In this sense, some EMOs are especially salient, such as Fe y Alegría, whose schools feature a pedagogical approach 
and organizational structure considered valid not only for Colombian education but for the entire South American 
continent (Parra & Wodon 2011 and 2014, Borjas 2003, Martiniello 2001, Jaimovich 2014). It is also interesting the 
case of the EMO Calasanz, which created an Institute of Education promoting the coordination of pedagogical 
issues and in-service training both in Colombia and Ecuador.
24. An emerging ﬁ nding of our research is the fact that CEC have generated a strong collective identity among parents 
and students; most of whom showed strong attachment to their school. Moreover, this collective identity is opposed 
to the public schools’ identities. While public school students are identiﬁ ed as “louts” or “marginal” (ñeros), CEC 
students are considered “quasi-posh” (gomelos). 
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the tender (which deﬁ ned some basic ﬁ nancial parameters), budget allocation (both 
external and internal) and the management of human resources, including teachers’ 
evaluations and employment conditions. However, CEC principals do have a high level 
of autonomy in hiring and ﬁ ring teachers; their autonomy in this aspect is much higher 
than the autonomy of public school principals.
Autonomy in human resources management is a particularly central aspect of the CEC 
program ontology. In fact, it is assumed that the management of human resources at the 
school level should contribute to generating cohesive teachers’ teams and strengthening 
teachers’ incentives through more ﬂ exible employment conditions and solid teacher 
evaluations, thereby increasing teachers’ productivity (Bonilla 2011, Villa & Duarte 2005, 
Patrinos et al. 2009, Barrera 2006 and 2009, Sarmiento 2008). However, the CEC’s 
management of human resources has been basically characterized by a drastic worsening 
of teachers’ employment conditions, including longer workdays and lower salaries than 
public school teachers, temporary contracts and non-recognition of years of experience. 
Although this worsening of employment conditions has been previously highlighted 
by other evaluations (SED 2004, Villa & Duarte 2005, Sarmiento 2008, Bonilla 2011, 
Bogotá Comptroller 2011), this is a clear and ﬂ agrant breach of the law25 that violates 
certain basic labor rights, such as the right to unionize and the correspondence between 
salaries and experience/ranks. Particularly, the exclusion of labor unions seems to be 
a conscious EMO strategy aiming to “ﬂ exibilize” teachers’ employment conditions by 
undermining their collective bargaining ability. These reasons explain the high turnover 
of CEC teachers and the incentives for CEC teachers to move to public schools as soon 
as they can. 
Paradoxically, bad working conditions are behind two of the most positive outcomes of 
the CEC program, according to its advocates: intensiﬁ cation of teachers’ engagement 
and efﬁ ciency. First, concerning the increase in teachers’ activities (as a proxy of 
productivity), our ﬁ ndings show that CEC teachers intervene in teaching planning 
activities and collaborate with the principal in a range of issues more often than public 
school teachers. This is the direct result of a strict teacher evaluation system26 that 
is applied within highly ﬂ exible working arrangements. The EMOs do not renew the 
contracts of teachers who do not adapt to the work pace and/or the extra activities 
required. Second, it is precisely the lower salaries paid by CEC that make these schools 
more economically efﬁ cient than public schools. Namely, more than half of the economic 
differences between the 40*40 public schools and the CEC are due to disparities in 
teacher salaries (SED 2013).27
Finally, the SED was expecting to control the quality of the program via regulation, 
evaluation, accountability and the potential exclusion from the program of poor 
performing CEC (Villa & Duarte 2002b). However, the CEC have been less strictly 
25. CEC, as all other publicly funded schools, are governed by the two Teachers’ Acts of 1979 and 2002, which clearly 
deﬁ ned teachers’ employment conditions. CEC are therefore not supposed to be able to establish  employment 
conditions different from those of public schools.
26. EMOs use a double teacher evaluation system: the ofﬁ cial or public system (which links ranks and salaries but is 
not always recognized by the CEC) and a parallel system (based on the EMO’s own criteria and key to determining 
teacher contract renewals). According to its advocates, the EMO’s teacher evaluation system is understood as an 
“accountability model” (Bonilla 2011; Sarmiento 2008).
27. However, the evolution of teachers’ salaries linked to the inﬂ ation rate has distorted the budget of the CEC and 
implied the modiﬁ cation of its internal cost structure. This linkage has been harshly criticized by CEC principals and 
EMO staff.
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controlled by the SED than expected according to the initial design. SED evaluations 
of the CEC faced some practical difﬁ culties: methodological discontinuities among 
evaluations (with the exception of the evaluations carried out by the IDEP in 2010 and 
2011) and the organic link between SED and IDEP, which undermines the credibility of 
the evaluations and breaks Clause 22 of the contract (stating that evaluations should be 
carried out by independent institutions or experts). Only the last evaluation carried out 
by the SED (SED 2014) is actually binding and has had real effects. 
 
Student enrollment has been one of the most challenging issues from the public control 
perspective. Theoretically, the SED had to assure that the CEC would follow the same 
admission procedure as public schools (criteria include proximity and socioeconomic 
condition) in order to give priority to the most vulnerable children (Vélez 2013, Sarmiento 
2005 and 2008, Peña 2005b). That would ensure that the CEC would effectively recruit 
children from the most marginalized sectors. In fact, while most CEC have met the 
requirements established by the SED on school admission, some have strategically 
selected students with better academic proﬁ les. It is not possible to quantify the 
dimension of this practice. Most CEC principals state that their schools strictly follow 
the selection processes established by the SED. However, our data28 also show the 
likely existence of cream skimming practices, which, among other implications, could 
undermine the potential for positive action of the CEC program and reduce its legitimacy.
 
Various elements have favored student selection, such as the high demand for CEC, 
ambiguity in the contract and the lack of strict SED control.29 Despite the former secretary 
of the SED’s assertion that “any process of selection [by the CEC] is not allowed, so 
adverse selection is avoided” (Peña 2005: 156), our data reveal that the SED is well 
aware of the prevalence of this situation and has not clearly intervened to correct these 
practices. This process of student selection can be understood as a “second-order 
competition” among schools. Since CEC have an excess of demand, schools compete 
not to attract any kind of student (“ﬁ rst-order competition”) but to attract students who 
are potentially high performers (Gewritz et al. 1995, Van Zanten 2009).
4.2 CEC’s Pedagogical Approaches
One of the salient characteristics of the CEC program is the transferability of educational 
practices. EMOs are expected to transfer their pedagogical and management know-how 
to the CEC (Castro et al. 2012, Peña 2005b, Villa & Duarte 2002b). However, this type 
of transference has not always taken place due to the variable social contexts in which 
the EMO’s pedagogical models and teaching practices are implemented. Contexts 
of structural violence require, for instance, school strategies for managing conﬂ ict 
resolution. Likewise, differences in parental socioeconomic status result in differences 
in school attachment and academic expectations of the families. From the perspective of 
principals and teachers, the effect of the context on the everyday life of the school is more 
28. The questionnaire used in this research shows that CEC principals have controlled 68 percent of student enrollment 
processes, and the SED only 45 percent. These proportions are inverted in the case of the public schools, where 
the SED controlled 81 percent of student enrollment processes, and principals only 38 percent. Our interviews also 
reﬂ ect that some CEC principals conduct interviews with parents and students to analyze their academic background 
(as well as consulting students’ previous academic records, tests or examinations) as a form of selection or pre-
selection of students.
29. As criticized by the SED itself; see SED (2004) and the internal document Monitoring CEC contracts.
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evident in those cases in which one EMO manages several schools in different social 
areas. This is particularly clear for those EMOs with a tradition of school management 
in high socioeconomic environments (namely, AAE and Gimnasio Moderno). Several 
studies have previously referred to the “context effect” as one of the clearest difﬁ culties 
that CEC have faced to achieve their educational goals (IAM 2004, IDEP 2007, Peña 
2005b).
One of the main expected objectives of the program was to increase the pedagogical 
diversity of the local education system as a result of the introduction of different 
education providers. It is certainly the case that CEC have introduced signiﬁ cant changes 
in pedagogical models and teaching practices. Namely, CEC put strong emphasis on 
values education (associated with religiosity, authority, discipline and entrepreneurship), 
active teaching, applied knowledge, cooperative work and a transversal approach to the 
curriculum (IDEP 2007 and Sarmiento 2008). Nonetheless, some of these pedagogical 
ideas have been difﬁ cult to apply due to the high student/teacher ratio that prevails in 
most CEC. At the same time, and against what Bonilla (2011) says, CEC schools seem 
to do more teaching to the test than public schools. Teaching to the test practices are 
common for two main reasons: the importance that SED evaluations give to ICFES 
results, and the importance of ICFES results for academic continuity to post-compulsory 
education.
The internal diversity of CEC (and EMOs) certainly increases the diversity of providers in 
the local education markets. This does not mean, however, that all CEC are necessarily 
innovative in their teaching practices. Some schools are actually very traditional in terms 
of religious values, authority, discipline and/or strict uniform policies. Nonetheless, it 
is also true that many poor parents value positively an educational model based on 
authority and discipline.
4.3 CEC’s Academic Performance 
The CEC were expected to increase the academic performance of poor students. 
Therefore, it was assumed that CEC students would perform better than their public 
school peers (social composition being equal). This improvement was associated to 
various factors: better infrastructure, full school day and/or more innovative and efﬁ cient 
teaching practices. In this sense, the CEC’s theory of change was therefore consistent 
with the principles of the broader theory of change behind PPPs in education (see Barrera 
2006 and 2009, Patrinos et al. 2009).
Interestingly enough, our analysis based on ICFES results shows no statistically signiﬁ cant 
differences between CEC and public schools after controlling two variables: school day 
and the socioeconomic status of students. In fact, both school day and student SES are 
more inﬂ uential on ICFES results than type of school (CEC or public school), a result that 
obviously challenges the assumption of the private sector being inherently better than 
the public sector. Our results clearly open an interesting discussion about the real added 
value of CEC as the most appropriate schooling modality to provide better opportunities 
for the poor.30
 
30. It seems that the addition (or exclusion) of SES, as well as school day, are key factors when asserting the superiority 
of private providers of education. For instance, previous studies that have compared the performance of CEC and 
public schools without taking into consideration SES or school day showed a better performance of CEC (IDEP, 
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Finally, according to our case studies, around two-thirds of CEC students have access 
to post-compulsory education. The VET track represents more than the 54 percent of 
CEC graduates’ post-compulsory continuity; this ﬁ gure is likely to be the result of CEC 
articulation with the SENA vocational training service. In comparison, university access 
represents around 42 percent of CEC graduates’ post-compulsory continuity. The bias 
in favor of VET reveals both the academic and economic barriers that poor students face 
to access the university sector, an aspect that the CEC program can hardly address (cf. 
García Villegas et al. 2013, Sánchez et al. 2002, Ministry of Education 2008).31
4.4 Discussion
This report reveals the existence of signiﬁ cant tradeoffs between some of the CEC 
program’s core principles. First, the theory of change of the CEC program assumed two 
mechanisms that can be partially contradictory: pedagogical autonomy and educational 
transference. Pedagogical autonomy is based on the capacity of the school to adapt 
to the social environment (and implicitly takes into account the effect of the context). 
Educational transference, on the contrary, is based on the desirability of importing 
successful models of schooling from elsewhere to different contexts. The EMO’s capacity 
of deciding on the school’s educational project reinforces this contradiction and makes 
the idea of pedagogical autonomy at the school level more difﬁ cult.
Second, the tendering process included a tradeoff between academic requirements 
(e.g., ICFES results) and the level of experience teaching in low SES contexts. These 
two aspects can hardly be found simultaneously. This is why some of the EMOs with 
recognized experience offering schooling in low SES contexts faced several problems 
with their bid (e.g., Fe y Alegría), while other EMOs without any experience in popular 
contexts were successful in the ﬁ rst tender (e.g., AAE and Gimnasio Moderno).
Another element to consider is the risk sharing that the program implies: despite risk 
sharing being one of the core principles behind any PPP program, the CEC have shared 
only limited risks. The SED made all the initial investment and provided the CEC with 
a privileged standpoint (e.g., full school day, better infrastructure and equipment). 
Moreover, the lack of school quotas ensured sufﬁ cient demand for CEC. Nevertheless, 
the program has created some risks for the private partners, especially economic risks. 
Private providers are obliged to ensure gratuity and to manage the school with the 
per capita amount established in the initial tendering. In addition, teacher salaries are 
externally determined and might evolve differently from inﬂ ation rates (as established 
2007, 2010 and 2011). However, other studies that have compared the performance of public and private schools 
including SES as an independent variable concluded that performance is similar. García Villegas et al. (2013), for 
example, based on an econometric analysis of 2011 ICFES test results, conclude that the SES effect accounts for 70 
percent of the academic results, while the school effect “only” explains 23 percent of the academic results. 
 Regarding other aspects of performance, CEC have higher levels of students who do not fail (+6.9 percent), less 
course repetition (–3.1 percent) and less dropout (–3.7 percent) than public schools (for similar results, see IDEP 
2011). Nevertheless, these are only very indirect proxies of performance and might be more indicative of school 
culture and teaching practices than objective signs of the learning process.
31. At this point, it is pertinent to refer to the low levels of access to higher education in Colombia. For instance, 
García Villegas et al. (2013) have shown that student SES is strongly linked to ICFES results and, therefore, access 
to tertiary education. Also, Sánchez et al. (2002), using a logistic regression analysis, stated that high student SES 
(between 3 and 5 MW) increases the probability of access to public universities. A Ministry of Education report 
(2008) concludes that student SES is statistically signiﬁ cant when analyzing tertiary education dropout rates.
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in the contract). Nonetheless, in terms of economic uncertainty the CEC teachers have 
been more affected than the EMOs. 
According to education privatization advocates, the charter school model seems to 
be territorially de-localized and context-resistant, since charter schools are expected 
to make education systems perform better almost everywhere. However, our research 
shows that the particular characteristics of the Bogotá education system strongly shaped 
the ways in which the CEC entered the system. In particular, although competition was 
considered as a key mechanism of the CEC program (see Villa & Duarte 2002a, 2002b and 
2005, Patrinos et al. 2009, Bonilla 2011: 36, Barrera 2006: 4), several structural factors 
obstructed its real materialization: a structural deﬁ cit of school places, the institutional 
regime of school zones limiting parental school choice capacity, and the fact that the few 
EMOs available to bid limited the competition of the tendering process. In addition, the 
importance of the ICFES, particularly in the case of the program evaluations carried out 
by the SED, had a crucial importance in shaping CEC’s pedagogical practices. Teaching 
to the test practices, widespread among all CEC, thus became a strategic response to 
the limitations of the contexts within which these institutions operate.
Finally, the implementation of the CEC program has created a differentiated—and 
unequal—situation between students of the same social background, because students 
enrolled in CEC might enjoy better material conditions and schooling services (i.e., full 
school day) than others of a similar SES enrolled in nearby public schools. The SED has 
found this duality difﬁ cult to handle. The end of the program would ostensibly prevent 
many families from enjoying a service to which they are highly attached. However, the 
maintenance of this situation implies discrimination for those families who have not 
had the chance to access better-resourced educational institutions, such as the CEC. In 
2014 the CEC contracts ﬁ nished and had to be reviewed by the SED. After conducting 
an evaluation of the program (see the main results in Table 20 of Appendix 2), the SED 
ﬁ nally decided to renew 17 of the 25 contracts. Eliminating some of the worst performing 
CEC and converting them into full-day public schools is a step forward, but it does not 
address at all the problem of the SED not guaranteeing education with the same quality 
conditions for all children.
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Appendix 1: 
Additional Interview Quotes
Enrollment processes: parents resorting to informal communication with 
and pressures on CEC staff
“Para el proceso si fue por medio de solicitud, entonces yo llené una carta, incluso la diligencié a 
mano, [me puso cuidado] y una de las cosas que, yo vine acá un día [que espere] y yo pasé la carta 
y después un buen día me acerque y le pregunte, y le pedí el favor que me tuviera en cuenta, y ahí 
ya fue cuando él me dijo que había mucha demanda, claro, entonces uno pasa por grosero.”
—Parent 1 CEC 12, February 26, 2014
“en esa época era muy difícil poder hablar con el rector .… Le dije al rector ‘estamos nuevos en el 
sector, queremos un buen colegio, y éste me gusta’ yo creo que de tanto insistir y de ver la cantidad 
de gente que hacía ﬁ la aquí …mucha gente, hay muchos padres que vienen a preguntar, todo el 
tiempo, realmente acá es difícil.”
—Parent 2 CEC 22, February 27, 2014
“lo que uno escucha de los papás, ¿si? o uno sale y los papás que están ahí: ‘mire profe, usted que 
es profesora de acá, porque no me colabora con un cupo, mire que es que ese colegio.’”
—Teacher 1 CEC 7, February 11, 2014
“no fue muy fácil conseguir el cupo para este colegio. … Me tocó ir a Secretaría varias veces para 
conseguir el cupo porque no habían cupos. … Entonces entrar acá no fue fácil porque primero había 
que venir o un martes o un jueves a las 3 de la tarde, hacer una ﬁ lita y ahí le programaban a uno 
la cita con la Rectora y pues yo perdí dos entrevistas porque la rectora como siempre ocupada, 
entonces bueno pero yo no me desanimé, seguí, seguí hasta que insistí y logré el día en que logré la 
cita con ella [la Rectora] y pues me anotó en un libro grande que ella tiene, me dijo: no le garantizo 
nada.”
—Parent 1 CEC 24, February 27, 2014
“en la entrevista con la Rectora se preguntan cuestiones como toca traer recibo de certiﬁ cado de 
donde uno vive, que estrato, el recibo de la luz … Y en qué colegio ha estudiado, o si lo sacó, y si lo 
sacó porque lo trae acá.”
—Parent 1 CEC 24, February 27, 2014
“A mí me entrevistaron, precisamente me hicieron también las mismas preguntas [que la entrevista 
de ahora]: ‘¿por qué escogió este establecimiento, este colegio?’ ...En el momento en que yo vine a 
matricular fue que me dijeron: ‘A usted ¿cómo le parece este colegio?’ … [La entrevista fue con] la 
trabajadora social sí y en ese momento pues la secretaria que estaba acá en ese momento.” 
—Parent 2 CEC 5, February 12, 2014
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“uno coge por cartas y no conoce nadie, no conoce al chino, no conoce al padre ni nada, entonces 
citamos a una entrevista … yo les digo: ‘Mire yo no voy a recibir una persona que sea un parásito 
que no haga nada contra una persona que trate de luchársela todo el tiempo y trate de ser uno de 
los mejores, o sea que la tenga clara para qué va a venir a estudiar aquí al colegio’. … Yo le digo 
‘¿pero bueno usted si va a poder? con todo esto por ejemplo dos o tres materias perdidas, ¿usted si 
va a poder? de verdad que usted me los promete porque es muy duro, el acoplamiento de distrital 
a acá es muy duro, en cambio de un privado acá no es tan duro.’” 
—Principal CEC 22, February 25, 2014
Focal groups also reported interviews with students: “–yo entré en quinto, mi mamá tuvo que hacer 
mucha ﬁ la, es muy difícil que lo atiendan a uno, para darle una ﬁ cha para que lo atiendan, a mí 
me tocó una entrevista con el director del colegio y fue una temporada que mi mamá duró viviendo 
mucho, y le decían que no había cupo … primero le dijeron que mi mamá que tenía que traer a la 
hija, y el doctor me hizo unas preguntas y me pidió los boletines del otro colegio” 
—Focal group CEC 22, February 20, 2014).
Enrollment processes: parents purchasing places for their children
“yo tengo un amigo, y bueno me tocó meterme [ríe] un poco en política, ¿si?, y entonces él tenía 
unos cupos y entonces me llamaron. Yo les llamé a ellos y les comenté. … él trabaja en el Consejo. 
Entonces le llamé y yo le dije que deseaba que mi hijo estudiara [aquí], pero que era imposible 
por causas de que había mucha demanda, y mucho inconveniente para entrar. Entonces me dijo 
‘déjeme, yo hablo, porque yo tengo unos cupos’. Y creo que hizo una reservación de cupos. Y 
entonces [él dijo] ‘yo tengo un cupo para que entre su hijo’, ustedes, ellos [AAE La Giralda] me 
llamaron y dijeron ‘tome el cupo para su hijo.’”
—Parent 1 CEC 20, Bogotá, February 28, 2014
“hace como cinco años cuando recién yo llegué, había gente que vendía los cupos … y vendían 
los cupos y decían: ‘yo soy amiguísimo de fulanito y entonces yo le consigo el cupo deme 250.000 
pesos’ … entonces los estafaban, la queja todo el tiempo, a partir de que empecé todo el tiempo a 
educar a los padres yo les mando en circular: ‘no se dejen llevar de las personas inescrupulosas que 
le están vendiendo, que les dicen que son amigos míos, todo el mundo es amigo mío pero yo no 
ofrezco cupos por amistad’”
—Principal CEC 22, Bogotá, March 4, 2014
Enrollment processes: student selection (cream skimming)
“De pronto piden el último boletín [escolar]”; 
—Parent 1 CEC 24, March 26, 2014
“pues yo vine con los documentos, evaluaciones, de pronto … sí, con las evaluaciones que le hacen a los 
niños. [E: ¿qué tipo de evaluaciones?] A mi niño que está en séptimo le hicieron una prueba para poder 
entrar;” and Parent 4 CEC 22“para entrar sí le hicieron una prueba, o sea que da uno como en espera, 
hasta que haya la opción de cupo, seleccionan los niños, ponen un cartel en la puerta, los llaman, les 
hacen unas pruebas… yo me acuerdo que [en las pruebas] les hacían sumas, dibujos, cositas así, porque 
ella iba a entrar a cuarto y entonces había la selección, habían cuatro niños, tres cupos.”
—Parent 2 CEC 22
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“no se piden tampoco muchos requisitos, pues si, los más fundamentales, exactamente como la 
conducta, sus, sus resultados académicos … osea se tiene que ser buen estudiante.”
—Focal group CEC 25, February 10, 2014
“el doctor me hizo unas preguntas y me pidió los boletines del otro colegio. … Depende de las 
notas [hacen o no exámenes] … pero hubo un tiempo, hace como 4 años, que abrieron cupos para 
algunos cursos, y ese día sí les hicieron pruebas a los que querían entrar.”
—Focal group CEC 22, February 22, 2014
“[la prueba que hacen al matricularse] Pues lo que nosotros habíamos visto allá [a la escuela pública], 
la prueba de aquí era un poquito más avanzada, sin embargo teníamos buenas bases de allá”
—Focal group CEC 13, March 5, 2014
“[¿Y ustedes por ejemplo cuando entraron a ustedes les hicieron algún tipo de prueba?] Sí una 
prueba … Como entre las materias básicas por ejemplo matemáticas, español, inglés, física, esas 
materias.”
—Focal group CEC 20, February 8, 2014
Consequences of student selection (cream skimming)
“[si se da selección de alumnado] es necesario investigar y hacer auditoria, o sea está mal que 
lo haga, hay algunas prácticas que uno ha notado, pero hay digamos si se da hay que corregir, 
hacemos auditoria de una al colegio si hay alguna una queja, pero en la práctica no debe ser es, 
algo anormal … o sea en la práctica no debería ser … quizá hubo más laxitud para que los colegios 
en concesión escogieran a sus alumnos, es posible … yo llevo aquí [a la SED] 6 meses … porque 
nosotros llegamos cuando ya esto [la selección de alumnado] estaba andando, entonces eso fue 
imposible [cambiar esa dinámica] … en la práctica lo que vienen haciendo siempre lo han hecho. 
Entonces no, desde hace como 8 años esto sigue tal cual, entonces nosotros seleccionamos tal, pero 
el colegio en concesión sigue.”
—Key informant, SED planning responsable, Bogotá, February 18, 2014
 
“el día que yo me enteré [que hay selección de alumnado] que fue cuando volví acá en abril del año 
pasado, mi nivel de rigor en el control de eso fue total … Y además cuando hicimos las matrículas 
que me tocaron a mí, yo instalé en cada institución educativa la base del SISBEN para veriﬁ car 
que el niño fuera prioritariamente de SISBEN 1, 2 o 3 como está en el contrato, y pedir un recibo de 
servicio publico para veriﬁ car la dirección y que estuviera… Vecino, esto fue me odió todo el mundo, 
yo allá con mi base instalada … Para que no hubiera ningún tipo de selección que no fuera positiva, 
pero en términos de pobreza… Discriminación positiva, bueno todo perfecto, después me entero 
que con los años resolvieron decirle a los concesionarios que hicieran lo que se les diera la regalada 
gana. [E: ¿Eso altera?] Pero por supuesto, seguramente, yo no sé quién, ni cómo lo han hecho, ni 
que pasó…. [El sentido original] Era usted tiene que recibir a los que están alrededor y a los más 
pobres, esa era la orden contractual y eso fue lo que yo veriﬁ qué hasta el último día … ¿Por qué 
hicieron eso? esa es la pregunta para mí del millón, ¿quién decidió eso?”
—Key informant, former responsible of CEC implementation, Bogotá, March 31, 2014
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“si no se cumple el concepto de la cercanía están violando el contrato y la Secretaría no debiera 
permitir eso … la Secretaría de educación le está haciendo concesiones adicionales que no tendría 
por qué hacerle al colegio. ... si la Secretaría permitiendo eso está violentando principios muy 
claros de la… que están además en la … [son contractuales] actuales. [E: Por qué la SED que 
probablemente conoce esas prácticas las permite?] Yo hay si no sabría [responder], yo por lo menos 
durante los 6 años que estuve en la Secretaría hicimos, eso no se permitía, no podía haber procesos 
de selección de los colegios, la única selección posible la hacía la Secretaría de Educación y la hacía 
no por razones académicas, sino una selección por cercanía o había algunos factores adicionales 
muy secundarios como por ejemplo uniﬁ car los hermanos [en el mismo colegio], etc.
—Key informant, former SED responsible and FECODE leader, Bogotá, March 11, 2014: 
“siempre lo he dicho [que los CEC seleccionan alumnados] ...[E: ¿Qué respuesta de los colegios en 
concesión, de los de Secretaría?] No, yo nunca [he recibido respuesta] …Nadie lo aborda ...Porque 
esa es la actitud y eso se hace si se institucionaliza, y se hace una forma de actuar].”
—Principal public school 3, March 19, 2014
School autonomy and human resources management 
“A estos maestros [de escuelas públicas] se les paga de acuerdo a un escalafón que está establecido en 
el estatuto docente, mientras que a este colegio [en concesión] no se le obligaba a pagar …¿qué fue lo 
que hicieron los colegios en concesión? Todos contrataron maestros de 7º categoría ...es decir que hay 
una economía de costos a costa de los derechos laborales y profesionales de los maestros. ...no reconocer 
a esos docentes las condiciones laborales, económicas, salariales que tenían en los colegios [públicos].” 
—Key informant, former SED secretary and FECODE leader, Bogotá, 11 March, 2014
“Cuando entra aquí a trabajar en la concesión o con la Alianza el contrato que teníamos era categoría 
del distrito, categoría 7º …siempre estamos un poquito por debajo del distrito, la remuneración sí.” 
—Teacher 1 CEC 20, Bogotá, February 28, 2014
“E: ¿se les reconoce aquí el rango? Sí, nos pagan hasta 10º [pero no más].”
—Teacher 2 CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
Teachers’ labor unions exclusion
“No, sindicatos no [hay], Colsubsidio es enemigo de los sindicatos, hay con otro tipo de personal un 
pacto colectivo que ellos han ﬁ rmado como tal, pero los profesores no participamos de eso.”
Principal 12
“[E: ¿Hay algún sindicato en este colegio?] No, prohibido … creo porque la parte privada, acá no 
nos dejan formar sindicato … en el Estado sí hay posibilidad, no se puede hacer posible. [E: Que de 
pronto una persona que tenga una iniciativa sindical, ¿qué pasaría con esa persona en un colegio 
de estos?] Chao … De una vez, eso es rápido que no hay, lógico pues los contratos de nosotros son 
contratos a 11 meses y un contrato termina a los 11 meses muy discretamente le dicen a uno ha 
terminado su contrato ¿sí?, es muy diferente cuando hay un contrato a término indeﬁ nido y puede 
la persona montar su sindicato, pero es muy imposible.”
—Teacher 3 CEC 22
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“[E: ¿Usted qué cree que pasaría si alguien comenzara hablar del tema del sindicato?] o pienso 
sinceramente que le llamarían [la atención] … porque hay como cierto temor de que de pronto si 
yo digo me echan, me retiran del cargo ¿sí?.”
—Teacher 3 CEC 24
“nosotros hemos tenido aquí profesores que se han ido para el distrito ¿sí? y estos profesores vuelven 
… nos dicen: ‘la situación es muy diferente, la situación de planeación, allá no se planea, entonces 
uno llega y pues haga lo que pueda con su materia, nadie te revisa clases, tú no planeas.’”
—Principal CEC 22
Principal and teachers’ planning activities
“yo tuve compañeros maestros del distrito y eran coordinadores y rectores, siempre que yo 
presentaba el plan operativo del colegio, me decían ‘¿ustedes a qué horas hacen todas esas cosas?’ 
… nos la pasamos casi todo el día acá, salgo a la 5 de la mañana y regreso casi a las 5 de la tarde 
estoy en la casa’ … los del distrito no pueden asumir eso: ellos no planiﬁ can … ellos se asustaban 
que yo llevaba las planillas”
—Teacher 3 CEC 22
“tengo compañeros (que se fueron a trabajar a colegios distritales) … y me cuentan: ‘Ricardito 
extraño a Fe y Alegría, extraño’ … no hay trabajo en equipo.”
—Teacher 1 CEC 24, March 26, 2014
“yo tengo una amiga muy querida que está trabajando … en el colegio Distrital Entrenubes … y ella 
que trabajó acá, porque ella se presentó y salió seleccionada. Ella dice que aquí hay mucho trabajo, 
mucho formato para llenar, porque acá se le da prioridad a eso y no al proceso … en el Distrital les 
toca estar detrás de las coordinadoras para que les regalen las guías.”
—Teacher 1 CEC 13, March 5, 2014
“los colegios en concesión son muy aprovechados … porque es mucho trabajo, mucho requisito, 
mucho papel, mucho formalismo, muchas cosas.”
—Teacher 3 public school 3, April 11, 2014
“[los profesores públicos se caracterizan por] la franja de tranquilidad, la franja de descanso, la 
franja de bienestar, ‘ya llegué aquí, aquí ya no me explotan,’ y entonces se hace una respuesta que 
no es ética … y yo me convierto en la persona que llego tarde, la persona que mira si puedo esquivar 
hoy el día.”
—Principal public school 3, Bogotá, July 11, 2014
“en los colegios oﬁ ciales los profesores prácticamente tienen su puesto asegurado, aquí hacemos 
evaluación de gestión y si en un término no cumple con el perﬁ l, no cumple con las metas, 
sencillamente se cambia y no pasa nada. A nivel Distrital les garantizan la permanencia a los 
profesores.”
—Principal CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
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“como profesor, teniendo la oportunidad de ir a la pública es muy bueno porque al ﬁ n y al cabo 
estoy asegurando mi futuro … Pero sin embargo, ya que he estado en las dos caras de la moneda, 
se vuelve uno más mediocre como docente; al ﬁ n y al cabo te relajas, no tienes problemas de que si 
no llegaste, escribes y listo … que de pronto en un colegio privado sí te tiene de control.”
—Teacher 2 CEC 5, Bogotá, February 12, 2014
“yo estuve en las dos partes, y la calidad es diferente … hay maestros que son malos en los privados 
y en todo lado; pero en el colegio privado, si eres malo, te sacan, acá no, tú haces las barrabasadas 
que quieras y lo que hacen es trasladarte para otro lado. En el sector privado, si tú llegas tarde te 
dicen ‘¡pilas!,’ en el distrital no.”
—Teacher 2 public school 2, Bogotá, July 12, 2014
Implementation of the double full school day
“[E.¿Hubo resistencias [a la implantación de la doble jornada]?] Unos colegios si, algunos de ellos 
fueron muy reacios y la prueba es que el aumento de la matricula fue muy leve, pero otros aplicaron 
el concepto, el criterio económico porque resulta que pues se le seguía pagando la misma plata 
por alumno … el Estado le iba a pagar si pasaba el colegio de 1.000 a 1.500 alumnos, le iba pagar 
1.500 alumnos”
—Key informant, former SED responsible and FECODE leader Bogotá, March 11, 2014
“Mira, así como se alteró la jornada completa, así como se alteraron tantas cosas”
—Key informant initial responsible of CEC implementation, Bogotá, March 31, 2014).
Centralized elaboration of the Institutional Educational Project (PEI)
“Yo era el asistente de la gerencia de educación de Comfenalco y tuve la oportunidad de elaborar 
la propuesta licitatoria para la SED de estos tres colegios [CEC: Nueva Roma, S. Vicente y S. 
Cayetano].”
—Principal CEC 12, Bogotá, February 4, 2014
“Bueno nosotros llegamos acá efectivamente la propuesta de la concesión [durante la licitación] 
y empezamos a buscar las temáticas, los estándares, de qué se regían digamos en cada área ¿sí? 
de 0 a 11 para español, para matemáticas, entonces se hicieron unos grupos de docentes de los 
cinco colegios, más unos capacitadores y docentes de la Universidad de Los Andes, en conjunto 
presentamos, pusimos en la mesa cuáles eran los estándares para ese entonces, los estándares, 
las necesidades de las localidades porque más o menos todas las localidades tienen las mismas 
localidades, el estrato 1 y 2 tuvimos en cuenta las necesidades y de ahí partimos para iniciar cada 
currículo, teniendo en cuenta primero las necesidades y los estándares que habían en ese momento.”
—Teacher 2 CEC 22, Bogotá, February 27, 2014
“[Todos los CEC Don Bosco] Llevamos la misma propuesta, los mismos lineamientos … Si, textos, 
llevamos todo, todo va como por la misma línea” 
—Teacher 2 CEC 7, Bogotá, February 10, 2014
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Labor orientation and entrepreneurship in Colsubsidio
“La idea es que los estudiantes no salgan para ser empleados, sino que tengan su propia empresa” 
—Teacher 3 CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
“Que tengan visión como hacia el futuro en cuestión de empleo”
—Parent 1 CEC 12, Bogotá, February 26, 2014
“que sean personas capaces de salir el día de mañana de acá y puedan formar su propia empresa”
—Parent 3 CEC 12, Bogotá, February 26, 2014
The impact of the context on teaching practices: awareness of contextual 
differences
“mucha prostitución, mucho de maltrato allá, y los papitos de allá, son niños que sus papás han 
estado en la cárcel, es un entorno en esa parte difícil, muy difícil, en [AAE Miravalle] por ejemplo 
hay un poco de maltrato infantil, entonces hay maltrato infantil para los niños, en [AAE] Argelia 
los papitos en su entorno los niños vienen de hogares desintegrados cosas así” 
—Teacher 1 CEC 22, Bogotá, February 27, 2014
“en [AAE] Atalayas es un ambiente digamos que prácticamente se logró crear [desde los inicios] un 
ambiente académico de disciplina y convivencia … era muy fácil hacer academia porque ya todo el 
resto estaba ya encaminado, el nivel académico estaba mucho más alto, en el [AAE] Jaime Garzón 
hay mucho papá que ha sido ya estudiante de universidad, por lo menos técnico o tecnológico 
entonces eso eleva un poco, acá [AAE La Giralda] no, acá tu encuentras un contexto donde hay 
mucha madre soltera que vive de lavar ropa, muchos recicladores, algo de delincuencia, entonces es 
un espacio mucho más pesado. Entonces luchar contra eso para construir lo académico es fuerte” 
—Principal CEC 20, Bogotá, February 25, 2014
“el contexto [de los distintos CEC de Colsubsidio] es bien diferente … este sector [San Cayetano] 
es más vulnerable, hay más pobreza, hay más abandono, de ellos mismos, entre comillas ellos 
mismo se pobretean, y eso los hace ver uno poco más disfuncionales con respecto a la localidad de 
la Victoria y de Nueva Roma … ellos son más centrales en la ciudad, aquí ya es como más rural … 
acá los chicos tienen una problemática fuerte yo digo que como de vandalismo afuera” 
—Teacher 3 CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
The impact of the context on teaching practices: pedagogical readjustment
“La idea original era que un modelo pedagógico que funcionaba bien para la clase docta, tuviera la 
experiencia de desarrollarlo en los sectores populares … para nosotros no fue traumático el aterrizaje 
en los sectores populares, porque nosotros toda la vida hemos estado en los sectores populares … 
[pero] los comentarios que se escucharon [de otros EMO] es que sí era muy complicado trasladar 
un modelo a un contexto con condiciones totalmente diferentes” 
—Key informant EMO Fe y Alegría director, Bogotá, February 4, 2014
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“Para la Alianza … manejar grupos de 18 muchachitos, es decir, allá manejaban grupos de 10 y 
de 12 muchachitos en las condiciones … unos niñitos que llegaban leídos, a llegar a enfrentarse a 
cursos de 35, 40. Entonces, ahí hay una cosa que a mí me dijo [de la universidad de] Los Andes 
alguna vez … ‘¿sabe qué?: entender el bachillerato, entender toda esa problemática nos ha llevado 
hasta a nosotros a cambiar currículos aquí’”
—Key informant former SED responsable, February 13, 2014
“la educación no solo es un colegio y unos docentes, hay unos factores asociados, hay un universo 
socioeconómico, o sea, eso tu no transﬁ eres el modelo del colegio Los Nogales [de Alianza Educativa] 
que es uno de los colegios más caros de Colombia a Ciudad Bolívar”
—Key informant initial responsible of CEC implementation, Bogotá, March 31, 2014
“Yo creo que en el imaginario de las personas que formularon el proyecto [de los CEC] desde el 
comienzo no cayeron muy en cuenta de la realidad socio económica de estas poblaciones, ellos 
hicieron un PEI [de AAE] muy académico que tiene sentido y vale para nuestra sociedad pero … 
eso es muy difícil y sobre todo en esos contextos, igual acá, el contexto aquí socioeconómico es muy 
pesado, si uno de alguna forma no maneja esos ambientes es muy difícil hacer [academia]” 
—Principal CEC 20, Bogotá, February 25, 2014
Leadership styles: planning activities
“allá [en las escuelas públicas] no se planea, entonces uno llega y pues haga lo que pueda con su 
materia, nadie te revisa clases, tú no planeas”
—Principal CEC 22, Bogotá, February 25, 2014
“yo tuve compañeros maestros del distrito y eran coordinadores y rectores … ellos no planiﬁ can”  
—Teacher 3 CEC 22, Bogotá, February 27, 2014
“tengo compañeros (que se fueron a trabajar a colegios distritales) … y me cuentan: ‘Ricardito 
extraño a Fe y Alegría, extraño’ … no hay trabajo en equipo.”
—Teacher 1 CEC 24, March 26, 2014
“yo tengo una amiga muy querida que está trabajando … en el colegio Distrital Entrenubes … y ella 
que trabajó acá, porque ella se presentó y salió seleccionada. Ella dice que aquí hay mucho trabajo, 
mucho formato para llenar, porque acá se le da prioridad a eso y no al proceso … en el Distrital les 
toca estar detrás de las coordinadoras para que les regalen las guías.”
— Teacher 1 CEC 13, March 5, 2014
Leadership styles: incentives schemes
“[los profesores públicos se caracterizan por] la franja de tranquilidad, la franja de descanso, la 
franja de bienestar, ‘ya llegué aquí, aquí ya no me explotan’, y entonces se hace una respuesta que 
no es ética … ‘aquí como no me molestan entonces yo bajo la guardia’ … y yo me convierto en la 
persona que llego tarde, la persona que mira si puedo esquivar hoy el día”
—Principal public school 3, Bogotá, July 11, 2014
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“en los colegios oﬁ ciales los profesores prácticamente tienen su puesto asegurado, aquí hacemos 
evaluación de gestión y si en un término no cumple con el perﬁ l, no cumple con las metas, 
sencillamente se cambia y no pasa nada. A nivel Distrital les garantizan la permanencia a los 
profesores” 
—Principal CEC 13, Bogotá, March 5, 2014
“como profesor, teniendo la oportunidad de ir a la pública es muy bueno porque al ﬁ n y al cabo 
estoy asegurando mi futuro … Pero sin embargo, ya que he estado en las dos caras de la moneda, 
se vuelve uno más mediocre como docente; al ﬁ n y al cabo te relajas, no tienes problemas de que si 
no llegaste, escribes y listo … que de pronto en un colegio privado sí te tiene de control” 
—Teacher 2 CEC 5, Bogotá, February 12, 2014
“yo estuve en las dos partes, y la calidad es diferente … hay maestros que son malos en los privados 
y en todo lado; pero en el colegio privado, si eres malo, te sacan, acá no, tú haces las barrabasadas 
que quieras y lo que hacen es trasladarte para otro lado. En el sector privado, si tú llegas tarde te 
dicen ‘¡pilas!’, en el distrital no” 
—Teacher 2 public school 2, Bogotá, July 12, 2014
School day
“era una situación que yo caliﬁ qué de discriminatoria en el Consejo de Bogotá. ¿cómo es posible 
que haya niños que son de los mismos estratos 1 y 2, pobres, que tengan la posibilidad de estar 
en una jornada completa, y otros que se les mantenga la situación de una jornada incompleta en 
niños [de medio día]? Eso era discriminatorio.”
— Key informant former SED responsible and FECODE leader, Bogotá, March 11, 2014
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Appendix 2: 
Additional Tables and Figures
Table 11—Contracts of the schools of the CEC program
EMO Number 
of CEC
CEC Localities Localities’ % 
Sisben 0 and 1
Beginning 
of the contract
Cafam 4 Cafam La Esperanza Bosa 9.2 1999
Cafam Los Naranjos Bosa 9.2
Cafam Santa Lucia Rafael Uribe 9.9
Cafam Bellavista Kennedy 1.1
Fenur 1 Durán Dussán Kennedy 1.1 1999
Don Bosco 5 Don Bosco I Ciudad Bolívar 61.9 1999
Don Bosco II Usme 46.6
Don Bosco III Usaquen 4.7
Don Bosco IV Usme 46.6
Don Bosco V Suba 1.4
Colsubsidio 5 Col. Torquigua Engativá 1.9 1999
Col. San Vicente San Cristóbal 7.5
Col. San Cayetano Usme 46.6
Col. Nueva Roma San Cristóbal 7.5
Col. Las Mercedes Engativá 1.9
Gimnasio Moderno 1 Sabio Caldas Ciudad Bolívar 61.9 1999
Calasanz 1 Calasanz Buenavista Ciudad Bolívar 61.9 2000
Alianza Educativa 5 AAE S. de las Atalayas Bosa 9.2 2000
AAE Argelia Bosa 9.2
AAE La Giralda Santa Fé 9.0
AAE Miravalle Usme 46.6
AAE Jaime Garzón Kennedy 1.1
La Salle 1 Juan Luis Londoño Usme 46.6 2002
Fe y Alegría 2 FYA José Mº Velaz Suba 1.4 2003
FYA San Ignacio Bosa 9.2
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Table 12—Percentage of pedagogical activities performed monthly in CEC and public schools
Public 
schools %
CEC 
%
CEC 
difference
Cramer’s v. coefﬁ cient
Meetings on school vision and mission 16.2 49.2 +32.0 0.322 moderate
Develop curriculum 40.8 58.7 +17.9 0.190 low
Discuss class material 34.1 48.8 +14.7 0.150 low
Exchange materials with colleagues 42.5 59.2 +16.6 0.148 low
Grade team meetings 74.0 86.7 +12.7 0.149 low
Deﬁ ne common evaluation standards of students 43.4 64.5 +21.1 0.212 low
Discuss learning of certain students 65.9 81.5 +15.6 0.164 low
Teaching together with colleagues 36.5 54.6 +18.2 0.157 low
Participate in professional development actions 22.2 57.5 +35.3 0.302  moderate
Observe colleagues classes and feedback 6.2 16.6 +10.4 0.216 low
Do activities with other courses (i.e., projects) 36.3 52.4  +16.1 0.167 low
 Coordination with responsibles of different areas 45.5 69.8 +24.3 0.218 low
Source: Own elaboration, based on survey.
Table 13—Percentage of principal’s activities performed “very often,” in CEC and public schools
Public 
schools
CEC 
%
CEC 
difference
Cramer’s v. 
coefﬁ cient
The principal discusses goals with teachers 57.1 92.0 +34.9 0.446 strong
The principal ensures consistency of teaching 
practices
65.1 94.1 +29 0.444 strong
The principal observes teaching practices 26.5 81.2 +54.8 0.558 strong
The principal suggest how to improve teaching 
practices
47.3 85.0 +37.7 0.431 strong
The principal reinforces teachers’ own initiative 66.1 88.8 +22.7 0.300 moderate
The p rincipal takes the initiative to solve 
teachers’ problems
46.0 70.4 +24.4 0.285 low
The principal ensures training opportunities for 
teachers
61.3 79.6 +18.4 0.222 low
The principal congratulates teachers who 
achieve goals
62.8 79.7 +15.9 0.200 low
The principal supports innovative teachers 67.0 82.3 +15.4 0.184 low
The principal and teachers work together 72.8 95.4 +22.6 0.365 moderate
The principal encourages teamwork 78.3 94.7 +16.4 0.332 moderate
The principal deﬁ nes the goals of teachers 67.3 88.3 +21 0.434 strong
The principal promotes a good climate 82.1 94.1 +12 0.258 low
All staff act together to ensure quality education 79.3 91.9 +12.5 0.343 moderate
Source: Own elaboration, based on survey.
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Table 14—Evolution of teachers’ salaries of Teachers Statute Act 2277 of 1979
Teachers 
rank
Salaries 2001* Salaries 2014** Salaries 
evolution 
(2001=100)
Cumulative 
inﬂ ation 
(200–2014)***
Difference
A 355,438 665,380 187.20 170.80 16.40
B 393,748 737,094 187.20 170.80 16.40
1 441,273 826,060 187.20 170.80 16.40
2 457,408 856,266 187.20 170.80 16.40
3 485,399 908,662 187.20 170.80 16.40
4 504,561 944,535 187.20 170.80 16.40
5 536,385 1,004,109 187.20 170.80 16.40
6 538,490 1,062,143 197.24 170.80 26.44
7 611,955 1,188,666 194.24 170.80 23.44
8 693,689 1,305,676 188.22 170.80 17.42
9 771,010 1,446,417 187.60 170.80 16.80
10 846,115 1,583,721 187.18 170.80 16.38
11 969,719 1,808,388 186.49 170.80 15.69
12 1,161,776 2,151,184 185.16 170.80 14.36
13 1,293,970 2,381,197 184.02 170.80 13.22
14 1,482,149 2,711,939 182.97 170.80 12.17
Source: Own elaboration based on * Act 1465/2001 (regulation of Teacher Status Act 2277 of 1979); ** Act 172/2014 
(modiﬁ cation of the remuneration of the teachers’ salaries of the 2277/1979), and *** Banco de la República 
de Colombia.
Table 15—Evolution of teachers’ salaries of Teacher Status Act 2001, 2004–2014
Rank Salaries 
2004*
Salaries 
2014**
Salaries 
evolution 
(2004=100)
Cumulative 
inﬂ ation 
(2001–2014)***
Difference
Superior 
normalist or 
technologist
609,435 1,121,819 184.08 142.10 41.98
829,290 1,430,005 172.44 142.10 30.34
1,251,513 1,843,384 147.29 142.10 5.19
1,437,871 2,285,199 158.93 142.10 16.83
Licensed or 
professional 
(=2)
766,950 1,534,628 192.09 142.10 49.99
1,161,802 1,960,718 163.78 142.10 21.68
1,499,673 2,429,075 152.83 142.10 10.73
1,618,722 2,874,648 168.33 142.10 26.23
Licensed or 
professional 
with a Master 
or PhD (=3)
1,157,310 2,748,898 237.52 142.10 95.42
1,448,434 3,238,872 223.61 142.10 81.51
1,648,697 4,053,508 245.86 142.10 103.76
1,749,648 4,671,871 267.02 142.10 124.92
Source: Own elaboration based on *  Act 4181/2004; **  Act 171/2014; and *** Banco de la República de Colombia. 
Note: Licensed or professional is a average of “with specialization” and “without specialization;” and Licensed 
or professional with a Master or PhD is an average of “with a Master” and “with a PhD.”
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Table 16—Agreement with statements about families’ participation, in CEC and public 
schools
Public 
schools
CEC Difference Cramer’s v. 
coefﬁ cient
Families participate in school 44.7 79.8 +35.08 0.364 moderate
Suggestions of families are taken into account 75.2 95.1 +19.9 0.358 moderate
Source: Own elaboration, based on survey.
Table 17—Ratio student/teacher by localities, Bogotá 2011
Localidad Preescolar Básica primaria Básica secundaria y media Total
Usaquén 25.85 30.81 29.04 28.23
Chapinero 23.73 26.85 21.88 22.07
Santa Fe 24.97 27.72 27.18 26.09
San Cristóbal 23.36 29.75 28.38 27.35
Usme 28.58 33.35 31.07 30.72
Tunjuelito 24.52 28.99 25.94 25.91
Bosa 30.74 44.58 38.87 39.02
Kennedy 27.54 37.00 32.29 32.41
Fontibón 26.40 29.95 27.38 27.06
Engativá 26.27 33.27 29.45 29.34
Suba 36.19 52.88 43.53 44.40
Barrios Unidos 21.27 24.36 22.52 22.10
Teusaquillo 14.33 27.09 18.23 19.29
Los Mártires 23.06 27.15 23.00 23.60
Antonio Nariño 24.35 29.70 24.52 25.01
Puente Aranda 23.35 26.31 23.44 23.54
La Candelaria 23.33 28.79 27.14 25.57
Rafael Uribe 26.03 29.10 27.12 26.78
Ciudad Bolívar 28.57 37.90 34.66 34.29
Sumapaz 6.70 5.53 9.52 7.31
Total 27.11 34.94 31.06 30.98
Source: Own elaboration, based on SED (2012: 42, 59).
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Table 18—Approval rate, repetition rate and dropout rate for Bogotá ofﬁ cial sector by type 
of school
Approval rate (2011) Repetition rate (2013) Dropout rate (2013)
Public schools 84.8 7.1 3.7
CEC 91.7 4.8 0.8
Difference total +6.9 –2.3 –0.9
Dif. preschool +1.8 –0.2 –1.8
Dif. Primary ed. +2.8 –0.7 –2.2
Dif. Low Secondary +8.9 –4.7 –1.2
Dif. Upper secondary +5.0 –2.1 –2.8
Source: Own elaboration, based on SED (2013b and 2014).
Table 19—Academic continuity and labor insertion of AAE (2009–2013) and Colsubsidio San 
Vicente (2001–2013)
Alianza Educativa
(2009–013)
Colsubsidio San Vicente
(2001–2013)**
Studying in post-obligatory 1,280 57.32% 376 64.61%
Others courses, non-formal education 170 7.61% s.d.
Total studying 1,450 64.93% 376 64.61%
Working s.d. 170 29.21%
Own business s.d. 15 2.58%
Other situations* 783 35.02% 222 38.14%
Total 2,233 100.00% 582 100.00%
Source: Own elaboration.
Notes: * include housewife, military service, emigration, and no occupation.
** The total is superior to 100% because there are students which are working and studying simultaneously. 
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Table 20—SED (2014) evaluation results
CEC EMO SED (2014) 
punctuation
SED (2014) 
evaluation 
position*
Contract renewal
Jaime Garzón Alianza Edu. 99.27 1 Contract renewal
Miravalle Alianza Edu. 97.03 2
Argelia Alianza Edu. 96.32 4
Buenavista Calasanz 94.95 5
Jose Mº Velaz Fe y Alegría 93.66 8
Las Mercedes Colsubsidio 92.64 9
Santiago Atalayas Alianza Edu. 92.57 10
Santa Lucía Cafam 91.64 12
Nueva Roma Colsubsidio 91.16 14
Don Bosco V Don Bosco 89.95 16
San Vicente Colsubsidio 89.45 17
La Esperanza Cafam 87.21 23
Torquigua Colsubsidio 87.21 24
Bellavista Cafam 85.16 29
Sabio Caldas Gimnasio Mod. 82.51 36
Los Naranjos Cafam 80.50 41
San Ignacio Fe y Alegría 79.34 44
Don Bosco IV Don Bosco 78.20 52 Public transition
La Giralda AAE 73.86 66
Don Bosco III Don Bosco 72.24 74
J.L. Londoño La Salle 70.74 77
Don Bosco II Don Bosco 66.30 92
San Cayetano Colsubsidio s.d. > 100 Public immediate
Don Bosco I Don Bosco s.d. > 100
H. Durán Dussán FENUR s.d. > 100
Source: SED (2014).
Note: * the rank is not only of CEC, but of all distritales in Bogotá.
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Figure 2—Actors responsible for several management tasks in CEC and public schools
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Source: Own elaboration, based on survey.
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Figure 3—Teachers’ salaries distribution among EMOs
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Source: Own elaboration based on our survey.
Figure 4—Actor with an important incidence, in pedagogical tasks, in CEC and in public 
schools (% of respondents at each category)
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Source: Own elaboration, based on survey.
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Figure 5—ICFES results by school, Bogotá 2011
Source: Own elaboration based on SED (2012).
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